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EVIDENCE ENGENDERED
Kit Kinports*
Although Edward Cleary left Champaign-Urbana long before I ar-
rived, he paved the way for those of us who are teaching evidence at
Illinois today, following in his footsteps without having had the opportu-
nity to meet him. We rely on his work as the Reporter for the Advisory
Committee that drafted the Federal Rules of Evidence, using the Advi-
sory Committee's Notes to help clarify the scope of the Rules and, more
fundamentally, to teach the importance of legislative history as a tool of
statutory interpretation. His comprehensive treatise on Illinois evidence
law' provides invaluable assistance in educating us about the differences
between state and federal evidentiary practices. Our colleagues who
served on the faculty with Ed Cleary have told us of his teaching skill, his
care for his students, and his support of innovative methods of legal edu-
cation.' Although he may have taught at Illinois before the arrival of
feminist jurisprudence, I therefore believe that he would have appreci-
ated, if not entirely endorsed, my attempt to articulate a feminist ap-
proach to evidence.
The reader without a background in feminist theory may approach
this article with some skepticism, wondering how a feminist perspective
can possibly be relevant to the study of "neutral" procedural rules that
are unrelated to the history of discrimination against women. On the
other hand, the reader well-versed in the theories of feminist jurispru-
dence may be skeptical for a different reason: given that the law of evi-
dence is premised on the adversarial, structured, hierarchical,
confrontational atmosphere of the courtroom, she might object, evidence
is an inherently gendered subject reflective of male values and therefore
cannot be modified to incorporate a feminist perspective.
Although both readers have a point, I believe that the truth lies
somewhere in the middle-that the evidence rules are gendered in a
number of important respects but could be improved by including a femi-
* Associate Professor, University of Illinois College of Law. A.B. 1976, Brown University; J.D.
1980, University of Pennsylvania. I am grateful to Mary Becker, Kathy Goldwasser, Tom Mengler,
Martha Minow, Laurie Reynolds, Steve Ross, Rich Schmalbeck, Elaine Shoben, and Daniel Yeager
for their comments on earlier drafts of this article.
I. CLEARY & GRAHAM'S HANDBOOK OF ILLINOIS EVIDENCE (5th ed. 1990).
2. See Cribbet, Tribute to Professor Edward W. Cleary, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 277, 280-82 (1989);
cf Cleary, Evidence as a Problem in Communicating, 5 VAND. L. REv. 277, 280, 295 (1952) (citing
literature from fields of communications, psychology, mathematics, and semantics because evidence
rules are based on "assumptions about human behavior" and therefore require "acquaintance with
what is developing in other areas").
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nist perspective. This article attempts both to describe the ways in which
current evidentiary rules reflect traditionally male norms and to suggest
methods of incorporating a feminist perspective.
In some areas, my conclusions are preliminary and tentative: femi-
nist theory raises questions about current doctrine but provides no clear-
cut answer to those questions. In fact, at certain points the feminist cri-
tique leads in different directions, making it impossible to accommodate
all feminist values at one time. In these areas, additional time and reflec-
tion will be necessary to determine which approach best furthers the fem-
inist ideal. At other points, implementing the feminist ideal in the
context of our gendered society will disserve the interests of women. In
these areas, the optimal approach in the short term may be a stop-gap
measure that is not ideal but is the best alternative in a nonideal world.
Part I of this article briefly describes feminist legal theory and its
evolution. Part II then discusses the extent to which evidence as a whole
is a gendered topic that reflects predominantly male traits and ideals, and
Part III analyzes various specific evidentiary doctrines from a feminist
perspective. Finally, Part IV examines ways of incorporating feminist
theories in teaching an evidence course.
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY
Although feminist jurisprudence has had different emphases during
its various stages of development, its basic premise has remained con-
stant: that the legal system subordinates women. Because the law was
created by white men of privileged socioeconomic background, it inevita-
bly reflects the viewpoint of that minority group and ignores the perspec-
tives of others, including women. The purpose of feminist jurisprudence
is therefore to " 'examin[e] ... the relationship between law and society
from the point of view' " of women.' More generally, feminist theory
"pursues the perpetual critique" 4
-it "question[s] everything."'
In its earliest form, feminist scholarship explored the ways in which
legal rules explicitly discriminated against women. Advocating equal
treatment of women and men,6 feminists sought to break down barriers
denying women equal opportunity in areas such as employment, 7 hous-
3. Wishik, To Question Everything: The Inquiries of Feminist Jurisprudence, I BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 64, 64 (1985) (quoting Catharine MacKinnon, Panel Discussion, Developing Femi-
nist Jurisprudence, 14th Nat'l Conference on Women and Law, Washington, D.C. (Apr. 9, 1983)).
4. Minow, Feminist Reason: Getting It and Losing It, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 47, 48 (1988).
5. A. RICH, ON LIES, SECRETS, AND SILENCE: SELECTED PROSE 1966-1978, at 13 (1979).
6. See, e.g., NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN, STATEMENT OF PURPOSE, reprinted in
B. FRIEDAN, IT CHANGED MY LIFE: WRITINGS ON THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 87 (1976) ("The
purpose of NOW is to take action to bring women into full participation in the mainstream of
American society now, exercising all the privileges and responsibilities thereof in truly equal partner-
ship with men."); Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1975).
7. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988), prohibited employers
from discriminating on the basis of gender, and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)
(1988), required that women receive equal pay for equal work.
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ing,8 credit,9 and education.' 0
After many of these overt forms of discrimination had allegedly dis-
appeared, however, some feminists realized that formal equality would
not end the subordination of women. They saw, for example, that
prohibiting employment discrimination against women" did not prevent
employers from insulating traditionally male professions by denying jobs
to women of childbearing age because of purported dangers in the work-
place,' 2 or by permitting sexual harassment of women by male cowork-
ers.' 3 Similarly, requiring equal pay for equal work 4 did not close the
wage gap,"' given continued segregation of women in lower-status jobs, 16
gender bias in assessing the value and difficulty of different occupations,'
7
8. The Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3676 (1988), prohibited discrimination,
for example, in the sale or rental of housing and the provision of brokerage services.
9. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1988), prohibited creditors
from discriminating with respect to any credit transaction.
10. The Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1988), prohibited gender discrimi-
nation in any educational program or activity receiving federal funds.
11. See supra note 7.
12. These "fetal vulnerability" policies are most common in male-dominated industries: em-
ployers have not seen fit to protect women working in traditionally female jobs who are exposed to
many of the same toxins. Moreover, those employers who have adopted fetal vulnerability policies
generally do not apply them to men even though the same chemicals may cause sterility in men and
genetic defects in their children. See, e.g., Becker, From Muller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability
Policies, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1219, 1236-41 (1986); Williams, Firing the Woman to Protect the Fetus:
The Reconciliation of Fetal Protection with Employment Opportunity Goals Under Title VII, 69 GEO.
L.J. 641, 649-50, 655-65 (1981). The Supreme Court recently held that sex-specific fetal protection
policies constitute facial gender discrimination in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 200(e-2 (1988),
and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, id. § 2000e(k). See International Union, UAW v.
Johnson Controls, Inc., 11 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
13. See, e.g., N. BETZ & L. FITZGERALD, THE CAREER PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN 232-34
(1987) (harassment is widespread and detrimental to women's advancement in job market); U.S.
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT:
AN UPDATE 20 (June 1988) (women who work in male-dominated jobs more likely to be harassed);
Crull, The Impact of Sexual Harassment on the Job: A Profile of the Experiences of 92 Women, in
SEXUALITY IN ORGANIZATIONS 67, 69-70 (1980) (24% of the women surveyed were fired and 42%
were pressured into resigning as a result of harassing behavior); Law, "Girls Can't Be Plumbers"--
Affirmative Action for Women in Construction: Beyond Goals and Quotas, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 45, 51-52 (1989) (finding widespread harassment of the few women in construction industry,
where men are particularly threatened by and hostile to women); see also N. BETZ & L. FITZGER-
ALD, supra, at 158-59 (observing that although formal job discrimination may have disappeared,
informal discrimination is still prevalent because employers prefer men for traditionally male jobs
and women for traditionally female jobs).
14. See supra note 7.
15. See Futter, Women Professionals. The Slow Rise to the Top, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 965,
965 (1989) (women earned 63c for every dollar earned by men in 1939 and 65c in 1988); see also,
e.g., C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 13 (1979); Brown, Baumann &
Melnick, Equal Pay for Jobs of Comparable Worth: An Analysis of the Rhetoric, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 127, 127-28 (1986).
16. See, e.g., N. BETZ & L. FITZGERALD, supra note 13, at 7-8; C. MACKINNON, supra note
15, at 10-11; Frug, Securing Job Equality for Women: Labor Market Hostility to Working Mothers,
59 B.U.L. REV. 55, 55 (1979); Stone, Comparable Worth in the Wake of AFSCME v. State of Wash-
ington, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 78, 78 & n.6 (1985).
17. See, e.g., C. MACKINNON, supra note 15, at 11-12; M. WrTr & P. NAHERNY, WOMEN'S
WORK: UP FROM .878, REPORT ON THE DOT RESEARCH PROJECT 18-33 (1975); Becker, Barriers
Facing Women in the Wage-Labor Market and the Need for Additional Remedies: A Reply to Fischel
and Lazear, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 934, 942-43 (1986).
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and evaluation of women's job performance according to male standards
of behavior. 8
Because the law is constructed around traditionally male norms, for-
mal equality turned out to bear little resemblance to actual equality. In
some cases, achieving formal equality did nothing to prevent hostile
courts from acting in an overtly discriminatory fashion. For example,
the Supreme Court's decision that employers who denied benefits to wo-
men disabled by pregnancy were not discriminating against women, but
only against "pregnant persons,"' 9 had an adverse impact on women that
was readily apparent.20
In other cases, a facially neutral rule was implemented according to
a traditional male perspective and thus in a manner detrimental to wo-
men. For example, many states have revised their alimony laws in the
interest of gender equality. Instead of an award intended to enforce a
husband's obligation to support his wife, alimony has become available to
either spouse depending on financial need.2 This change has led to a
reduction in the alimony payments made to women; the courts have pre-
sumed that women and men compete equally in the job market and
therefore have made unrealistic assumptions about a woman's ability to
support herself and her children.22 As a result, a man's standard of liv-
ing rises substantially after divorce because he is spending less (or noth-
18. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 17, at 944-46; Kaye, Women Lawyers in Big Firms: A Study in
Progress Toward Gender Equality, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 111 (1988); Taub, Keeping Women in Their
Place: Stereotyping Per Se As a Form of Employment Discrimination, 21 B.C.L. REV. 345, 353-58
(1980); Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797, 822-34 (1989); Zimmer, How Wo-
men Reshape the Prison Guard Role, 1 GENDER & Soc'Y 415 (1987); see also Crenshaw,
Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination
Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 141-50 (noting that
courts have failed to understand problems facing women of color in the job market and therefore
have not adequately protected them from employment discrimination); Note, Conceptualizing Black
Women's Employment Experiences, 98 YALE L.J. 1457 (1989) (same).
19. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974); see also General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S. 125, 133-40 (1976). Congress overturned the Court's decision in the Pregnancy Discrimi-
nation Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988). But cf Wimberly v. Labor & Indus. Relations
Comm'n, 479 U.S. 511 (1987) (federal unemployment statute that prohibits discrimination against
pregnant women does not preclude state that denies unemployment benefits to employees who leave
work voluntarily without good cause for reasons unrelated to job from denying benefits to woman
who took pregnancy leave and found no positions available when she was ready to return to work).
20. See, e.g., Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the
Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1136-41 (1986); Kay, Equality and Difference: The
Case of Pregnancy, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 30-32 (1985); Scales, Towards a Feminist Jurispru-
dence, 56 IND. L.J. 375, 398-401 (1981); Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal
Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325, 338-46 (1984-1985).
21. See L. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECO-
NOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 145-50 (1985).
22. See, e.g., ILLINOIS TASK FORCE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS, THE 1990 REPORT OF
THE ILLINOIS TASK FORCE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS 47-51 (1990); L. WEITZMAN, supra
note 21, at 163-214; Goldfarb, Marital Partnership and the Case for Permanent Alimony, 27 J. FAM.
L. 351, 370 (1988-1989); Report of the New York Task Force on Women in the Courts, 15 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 11, 74-77 (1986-1987); Schafran, Eve, Mary, Superwoman: How Stereotypes About Women
Influence Judges, JUDGES' J., Winter 1985, at 12, 50-52.
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ing23) to support his family, while a woman's standard of living declines
dramatically.24 Likewise, the criminal law permits the use of deadly
force against an assailant whom the defendant reasonably believed posed
an imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm." Although again
the standard appears neutral on its face, judges and juries often apply
male norms of "reasonableness" and therefore convict women who acted
to protect themselves in situations where the reasonable man might not
have been afraid-where, for example, an abusive husband was only
threatening his wife or had recently completed a beating.26
Disenchantment with the quest for formal equality led some femi-
nists to begin emphasizing differences between women and men. Men
tend to value autonomy, abstract reasoning, individual rights, hierarchi-
cal organization, and detachment from others, they said, whereas women
are more likely to value relationships, contextual reasoning, interdepen-
dence, and connection and responsibility to others.2 Recognizing the
biological, social, and psychological differences between women and
men, together with the fact that society was created in large part by privi-
leged white men to reflect their values, some feminists have rejected ef-
forts to assimilate into the male-dominated world, preferring instead to
attempt to restructure society to take into account women's concerns and
values.2" Others, however, fear that focusing on gender differences will
perpetuate stereotypes about women and thereby contribute to their con-
tinued subordination.29
23. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY: 1987, CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS, SPECIAL STUDIES, SERIES P-23, No. 167, at 4, 8 (June 1990) (only 45% of
divorced 'vomen received any child support payments and only 16.8% were awarded alimony).
24. See, e.g., L. WEITZMAN, supra note 21, at 323-43 (using index of economic well-being
developed by federal government and adjusting for family size and for each family member's age and
sex, study of 2500 cases in California revealed that on average, man's standard of living increased by
42% and woman's declined by 73%); Corcoran, Duncan & Hill, The Economic Fortunes of Women
and Children: Lessons from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, in WOMEN AND POVERTY 7, 16
(1986); N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1991, at 8, col. I (Bureau of Census report released March 1, 1991
found that the percentage of children in poverty doubled, increasing from 19% to 36%, within four
months after father left home; family income, adjusting for family size, declined by 26% after father
left).
25. See 1 W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 652 (1986).
26. See Kinports, Defending Battered Women's Self-Defense Claims, 67 OR. L. REV. 393, 415-
16, 423-26 (1988); Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defense,
15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 623 (1980); Schneider & Jordan, Representation of Women Who De-
fend Themselves in Response to Physical or Sexual Assault, 4 WOMEN'S RT. L. REP. 149 (1978). See
generally State v. Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d 221, 240-41, 559 P.2d 548, 558-59 (1977) (criticizing "per-
sistent use of masculine gender" in jury instructions defining self-defense); Donovan & Wildman, Is
the Reasonable Man Obsolete? A Critical Perspective on Self-Defense and Provocation, 14 Loy.
L.A.L. REV. 435 (1981).
27. See, e.g., C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 5-23 (1982); West, Jurisprudence and
Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 13-42 (1988); West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A
Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 81, 140-41 (1987).
28. See, e.g., C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 32-45 (1987); Becker, Prince Charm-
ing: Abstract Equality, 1987 SuP. CT. REV. 201; Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 1279 (1987); Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J.
1373 (1986).
29. See, e.g., Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1699, 1717, 1718
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The most recent stage of feminist theory recognizes differences
among women and criticizes the earlier feminist literature for assuming
that all women share the same perspectives and experiences, regardless of
their race, class, and sexual orientation.3" Because feminism involves lis-
tening to women and taking their concerns seriously, a feminist must not
presume that white, middle-class, heterosexual women speak for all wo-
men but must instead strive to rise above the confines of her own limited
perspective and consider the diversity of women's experience.3"
Others have applied these feminist methods to the law governing
torts,32 contracts, 33 crimes, 34 property,3  constitutional rights,36 family
(1990) (suggesting that women's "ethic of care" might be "an artifact of coping with oppression,"
and warning that "a group that seeks liberation from a dominating system of thought should be very
suspicious of adopting its categories"); Williams, supra note 18. This controversy recently focused
on the Supreme Court's decision in California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272
(1987). In that case, the Court upheld a state statute that required employers to provide up to four
weeks of unpaid leave to employees disabled by pregnancy, rejecting the employer's argument that
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988), preempted the state statute. The
advocates of special treatment supported the legislation, see, e.g., Finley, supra note 20; Kay, supra
note 20, while the supporters of equal treatment opposed the statute because it treated women and
men differently, see, e.g., Williams, supra note 20.
30. See, e.g., B. HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY FROM MARGIN TO CENTER 1-15, 43-65 (1984);
Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 191 (1989-
1990); Crenshaw, supra note 18; Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 581 (1990); Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101
HARV. L. REV. 10, 57-70 (1987); Palmer, White Women/Black Women: The Dualism of Female
Identity and Experience in the United States, 9 FEMINIST STUD. 151 (1983).
For example, Angela Harris has challenged the feminist critique of rape laws because it ignores
the perspective of women of color, for whom "rape is a far more complex experience, and an experi-
ence as deeply rooted in color as in gender." Harris, supra, at 598. Harris notes that women of color
are more vulnerable to rape than white women and are less protected by the criminal justice system,
but at the same time they approach the rape laws with a "unique ambivalence" because "for black
people, male and female, 'rape' signifie[s] the terrorism of black men by white men, aided and abet-
ted, passively (by silence) or actively (by 'crying rape') by white women." Id. at 601, 599.
31. As Katharine Bartlett has observed, "recognizing oppression one has not experienced" is a
very difficult task, one that I, like everyone else, can only attempt to accomplish. Bartlett, Feminist
Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 849 (1990).
32. See Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUc. 3 (1988);
Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women's Issues in a Torts Course, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMI-
NISM 41 (1989); Love, Bringing Gender Issues into the Torts Course, Newsletter of the Ass'n of
American Law Schools Section on Torts-Compensation Systems, Fall 1989, at 4; Tobias, Gender
Issues and the Prosser, Wade, and Schwartz Torts Casebook, 18 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 495
(1988).
33. See Frug, Re-Reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34 AM.
U.L. REV. 1065 (1985).
34. See Coombs, Crime in the Stacks, or a Tale of a Text: A Feminist Response to a Criminal
Law Textbook, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 117 (1988); Erickson, Final Report: "Sex Bias in the Teaching of
Criminal Law," 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 309 (1990); Erickson, Sex Bias in Law School Courses: Some
Common Issues, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 101 (1988).
35. See Johnston, Jr., Sex and Property: The Common Law Tradition, the Law School Curricu-
lum, and Developments Toward Equality, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1033 (1972); Younger, Community
Property, Women and the Law School Curriculum, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 211 (1973).
36. See Becker, Obscuring the Struggle: Sex Discrimination, Social Security, and Stone, Seid-
man, Sunstein & Tushnet's Constitutional Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 264 (1989); Karst, Woman's
Constitution, 1984 DUKE L.J. 447; Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV.
955 (1984); Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L.
REV. 543 (1986).
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relationships,37 and civil procedure.38 To date, however, no one has ana-
lyzed the law of evidence from a feminist perspective. What follows is
my attempt to do so.
II. A FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE AS A WHOLE
Feminist theory would question on several levels the very concept of
a code of evidence-a body of formal, abstract, complex evidentiary rules
like the Federal Rules of Evidence.39 In place of the current evidence
codes, a feminist perspective would advocate an approach to evidence
that was less abstract and more tied to the context of a particular case,
that simplified the rules to make them more accessible to nonlawyers and
therefore less hierarchical, that fostered cooperation rather than competi-
tion between the parties, and that envisioned less formal procedures. At
the same time, a feminist approach would strive to incorporate women's
perspectives and accommodate their needs. Accomplishing the latter
goals requires efforts to ensure that the law of evidence does not explic-
itly discriminate against women and that facially neutral rules are not
applied in ways detrimental to women. In addition, the evidence rules
must reflect not only the views of privileged white men but also the dif-
fering concerns and perspectives of others. The following discussion ex-
plores ways in which these feminist goals might be implemented, and the
extent to which they all can be accommodated at this time.
A. The Abstract Nature of the Law of Evidence
First, the feminist critique would question the abstractness and
universality of evidence codes, and their tendency to ignore the unique
factual context of each case and the interests of the individual litigants.
For example, the evidentiary rules appropriate for takeover litigation in-
volving two large corporations, each represented by a team of attorneys,
are not necessarily suitable in a custody trial aimed at determining the
best interests of the child or in a welfare recipient's suit to recover im-
properly withheld benefits. A feminist approach to evidence would be
more concerned with finding rules appropriate to a given context than
with articulating abstract rules of general usefulness. 4'
On the other hand, the only alternatives to an abstract, general evi-
37. See Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 1497 (1983).
38. See Korn, Changing Our Perspective on Arbitration: A Traditional and a Feminist View,
1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 67; Schneider, Rethinking the Teaching of Civil Procedure, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC.
41(1987).
39. Although the Federal Rules govern only federal trials, more than 30 states have adopted
evidence codes modeled on the Federal Rules. See M. GRAHAM, EVIDENCE: TEXT, RULES, ILLUS-
TRATIONS AND PROBLEMS xx (2d ed. 1988).
40. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyer-
ing Process, I BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 58 & n.S (1985); Spiegelman, Integrating Doctrine,
Theory and Practice in the Law School Curriculum: The Logic of Jake's Ladder in the Context of
Amy's Web, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 243, 247-49 (1988). But cf J. GRIMSHAW, PHILOSOPHY AND
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dence code would be to create different sets of rules for different types of
cases; to give the trial court virtually unchecked power in ruling on ques-
tions of evidence; or to eliminate the evidence rules altogether, allowing
the jury to hear any evidence the parties wish to present. Formulating
separate evidence rules for each unique situation would be an unmanage-
able task, given the variation in the types of suits filed, the interests and
resources of the parties, and the quality of their attorneys.4 1
The second option, complete judicial discretion, is likely to lead to
arbitrariness; rules are enacted for the very purpose of limiting capricious
decisionmaking.42 In addition, leaving the evidentiary rules to the sole
discretion of judges, most of whom are upper- or middle-class white men,
will tend to perpetuate a traditional male perspective,43 leading to dis-
crimination against women. Even a cursory examination of other areas
in which judges have enjoyed unfettered discretion in the past illustrates
the adverse effects such an approach is likely to have on women.
For example, judges currently apply the amorphous "best interests
of the child" standard in resolving custody disputes;" the presumption in
favor of the mother has been eroded by the goal of formal gender equal-
ity.45 Stereotypes about gender roles have led judges to deny custody to
women who work outside the home, who have sexual relationships after
separating from the children's father, or who otherwise fail to measure
up to idealistic judicial notions of motherhood. Likewise, fathers have
obtained custody when they exhibit some minimal interest in child rear-
ing, when they remarry, or when they are better able to support the chil-
dren financially.46 In addition to disadvantaging women in specific
FEMINIST THINKING 204-11 (1986) (noting that women, like men, adhere to principles, but that
women's principles value relationships and therefore differ from those followed by men).
41. See Mengler, The Theory of Discretion in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 IOWA L. REV.
413, 459-66 (1989) (criticizing concept of evidence code more detailed than Federal Rules); Tanford,
A Political-choice Approach to Limiting Prejudicial Evidence, 64 IND. L.J. 831, 839-40 (1989).
42. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 31, at 852; Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Con-
sidering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2325 (1989) (preferring formal rules and proce-
dures because "informality and oppression are frequent fellow-travelers").
43. See Minow, supra note 30, at 45-50; Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the
Aspirations for Our Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1878, 1908 (1988) ("A judge is either male or female
and is of a particular race, class, and social position; the appearance of neutrality, of evenhanded-
ness, of impartiality is false comfort."); Tanford, supra note 41, at 838-39, 857 (judges' "ideological
predispositions" and "political biases" influence their evidentiary rulings); cf. Abrahamson, The Wo-
man Has Robes: Four Questions, 14 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 489, 494 (1984) (observing that in
exercising her judicial responsibilities, "[a]ll my life experiences-including being a woman-affect
me and influence me").
44. See H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 797-98 (2d
ed. 1988).
45. See id. at 799-800; L. WEITZMAN, supra note 21, at 217.
46. See, e.g., ILLINOIS TASK FORCE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS, supra note 22, at 80-
81; Polikoff, Why Are Mothers Losing: A BriefAnalysis of Criteria Used in Child Custody Determina-
tions, 7 WOMEN'S RT. L. REP. 235 (1982); Report of the New York Task Force on Women in the
Courts, supra note 22, at 105-12; Wexler, Rethinking the Modification of Child Custody Decrees, 94
YALE L.J. 757 (1985); Woods, Bean & Schulman, Sex and Economic Discrimination in Child Cus-
tody Awards, 16 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1130 (1983); cf Burchard v. Garay, 42 Cal. 3d 531, 539-40,
724 P.2d 486, 491-92, 229 Cal. Rptr. 800, 805-06 (1986) (prohibiting judges from basing custody
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custody cases, these gendered attitudes and the uncertainty created by
the vague "best interests of the child" standard have substantially im-
proved the negotiating position of the father in a divorce proceeding: un-
sure of the outcome of a custody fight, the mother is often willing to
bargain away alimony, child support, and a favorable division of marital
property in the face of the father's threat to seek custody.
Traditionally, judges have also been given substantial discretion in
sentencing,48 and gender bias has led them to impose harsher sentences
on women who offend judicial expectations of proper gender roles. Thus,
women tend to receive longer sentences than men when they are con-
victed of violent crimes,49 and girls are likely to be punished more se-
verely for noncriminal status offenses like running away, while similar
behavior by boys is typically ignored.5" Likewise, gender bias has re-
sulted in inappropriately lenient sentences in domestic assault cases5" and
decisions on woman's job or man's financial assets). But cf. L. WEITZMAN, supra note 21, at 223-43
(concluding that abolition of presumption favoring mothers had little impact on percentage of fa-
thers who requested or obtained custody; finding, however, that almost two-thirds of fathers who
seek custody are successful).
47. See ILLINOIS TASK FORCE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS, supra note 22, at 78-79;
Erlanger, Chambliss & Melli, Participation and Flexibility in Informal Processes: Caution from the
Divorce Context, 21 LAW & Soc'y REV. 585, 597 (1987); Lefcourt, Women, Mediation and Family
Law, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 266, 268-69 (1984); Minow, Consider the Consequences (Book Re-
view), 84 MICH. L. REV. 900, 907-08 (1986).
48. See 3 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 122-23 (1984).
49. See, e.g., A. BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL 11 (1987); Smart, Criminological
Theory: Its Ideology and Implications Concerning Women, in WOMEN AND CRIME IN AMERICA 6,
13 (L. Bowker ed. 1981); Temin, Discriminatory Sentencing of Women Offenders: The Argument for
ERA in a Nutshell, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 355 (1973); see also L. SCHAFRAN, PROMOTING GENDER
FAIRNESS THROUGH JUDICIAL EDUCATION: A GUIDE TO THE ISSUES AND RESOURCES 146 (1989)
(noting that women of color and poor women charged with killing abusive husbands are less likely to
be acquitted or given suspended sentences).
In some cases, however, women receive more lenient sentences because judges do not want to
separate them from their families. See, e.g., Daly, Discrimination in the Criminal Courts: Family,
Gender, and the Problem of Equal Treatment, 66 SOC. FORCES 152 (1987); Daly, Rethinking Judicial
Paternalism: Gender, Work-Family Relations, and Sentencing, 3 GENDER & SOC'Y 9 (1989).
Although this disparity is based on gendered attitudes about the woman's role as primary caretaker,
in fact women continue to have primary responsibility for child rearing and household chores--even
though most women hold jobs outside the home as well. See, e.g., N. BETZ & L. FITZGERALD,
supra note 13, at 204-05; P. BLUMSTEIN & P. SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES 144-46 (1983); A.
HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT 1-10, 277-84 (1989); Williams, supra note 18, at 823; see also N.
BETZ & L. FITZGERALD, supra note 13, at 5 (as of 1984, women constituted 44% of work force;
63% of women aged 18 to 64 worked outside the home, including more than half of all married
women, 61% of mothers with children under 18, and 52% of mothers with preschool children);
Williams, supra note 18, at 832 (as of 1987, 59% of married women worked outside the home,
including 51% of mothers with children under three and 54% of those with children under six). If
family obligations are a relevant factor in sentencing, judges ideally should examine the actual facts
of each case to determine whether the defendant is entitled to leniency on that ground. In the
absence of rigorous scrutiny of each individual case, a presumption that women are more likely to
have child rearing responsibilities is more realistic and thus the second best alternative.
50. See FEMALE OFFENDER RESOURCE CENTER, AM. BAR ASS'N, LIVLE SISTERS AND THE
LAW 3-13 (1977); Armstrong, Females Under the Law: 'Protected'but Unequal, in THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM AND WOMEN 61, 68-72 (1982); Chesney-Lind, Guilty by Reason of Sex: Young
Women and the Juvenile Justice System, in THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND WOMEN 77
(1982).
51. See, e.g., ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, FINAL REPORT
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in rape cases where the victim was acquainted with the defendant or en-
gaged in behavior the judge considered inappropriate, such as flirting or
dressing provocatively.52
This record leaves little room for optimism should judges be given
unfettered discretion in defining the rules of evidence-and that pessi-
mism is only confirmed by examining areas in which judges currently
enjoy substantial discretion in making evidence rulings. When exercising
their broad discretion in admitting expert testimony, for example, some
judges have excluded testimony describing the battered woman syn-
drome and the rape trauma syndrome because of myths about battered
women and rape victims.53 Similarly, misplaced concerns about the
credibility of rape and child abuse victims have led judges to permit de-
fense attorneys to engage in harassing and abusive cross-examination of
the victims and to introduce irrelevant evidence about their private
lives.54 Absolute judicial discretion in making evidentiary decisions un-
restrained by legislative rules or appellate court review would likely
make these and similar rulings even more prevalent.
The final alternative, abolishing evidence rules altogether and letting
the jury determine what evidence it deems important, would create simi-
lar problems. Like judges, jurors subscribe to gendered attitudes and
thus are likely to act in ways harmful to women if their prejudices are not
constrained by rules that exclude irrelevant and prejudicial evidence.55
The disadvantages of the only feasible alternatives suggest that the
"middle course" 56 advocated by Ed Cleary and reflected in the Federal
Rules may be the most sensible in the short run. These abstract rules are
intended to govern all cases, and therefore may well "function as impedi-
ments to optimally sensitive decisionmaking."57 Perhaps, however, as
Tom Mengler has argued, the drafters of the Rules "belie[ved] that each
trial is unique and calls for discrete resolution" and therefore proposed a
set of rules designed to give judges "the maneuverability to craft rulings
to do individual justice."58 Although complete judicial discretion or out-
right abolition of the evidence rules might be even more consistent with a
contextual feminist approach, imposing limits is necessary in a world
27-43 (1984); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, UNDER THE RULE OF THUMB: BATTERED WOMEN
AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 33-34, 59-60 (1982).
52. See, e.g., Bohmer, Judicial Attitudes Toward Rape Victims, 57 JUDICATURE 303, 304-05
(1974); Report of the New York Task Force on Women in the Courts, supra note 22, at 58; Schafran,
supra note 22, at 17, 48; see also infra note 88 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 88-89, 173-79 & 188-205 and accompanying text. See generally infra note
172.
54. See infra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., infra notes 88-89 & 185-87 and accompanying text.
56. Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Reform of Federal
Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1973) (testimony of
Edward Cleary) (describing the Federal Rules as "a middle course between vague generalities and
constricting particularity").
57. Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 539 (1988).
58. Mengler, supra note 41, at 458.
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where judges and jurors are infected by the society's gendered attitudes.5 9
For now, therefore, the ideal of contextual decision making must be sac-
rificed in favor of the more pragmatic, though perhaps less satisfying,
approach of working within the current structure to change those aspects
of the evidence rules that discriminate against women or ignore their
concerns. 60
B. The Hierarchical Nature of the Law of Evidence
A feminist approach to evidence would also suggest that the rules of
evidence are unnecessarily technical and hierarchical. Their complexity
makes the law of evidence inaccessible to all but the most practiced liti-
gators and thereby contributes to the hierarchical mystique that sur-
rounds the legal profession and the litigation process.61
Any teacher or student of evidence can readily come up with her
own favorite illustrations of the intricacies embedded in the Federal
Rules. For example, the conditional relevance rule applies when the rele-
vance of a piece of evidence "depends upon the fulfillment of a condition
of fact"; in such cases, the courts are instructed to admit the evidence
"upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a
finding of the fulfillment of the condition. 62 Almost all testimony pro-
vides only a piece in the puzzle, however, so that any evidence can be
considered irrelevant if the rest of the pieces are not yet in place. Even
an eyewitness's testimony that she saw the defendant shoot the victim is
relevant only if the incident she witnessed occurred on the day of the
alleged crime.63 The conditional relevance rule therefore needlessly cre-
ates an "obstacle course" for trial lawyers and judges instead of relying
on commonsense judgments about the pertinence of a given piece of
evidence.'
59. Peggy Radin has referred to this dilemma as the "'Heads the man wins, tails the woman
loses' irony of the double bind." Radin, supra note 29, at 1704 n.13.
60. For examples of other feminist literature advocating a utilitarian or pragmatic approach,
see, e.g., Becker, The Rights of Unwed Parents: Feminist Approaches, 63 Soc. SERV. REV. 496, 505-
13 (1989); Radin, supra note 29.
61. Cf Williams, Alchemical Notes:" Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 403 (1987) ("non-corporate clients lookfl to lawyers almost as gods,"
asking them to "work the very best of whatever theory-magic [they] learned in law school"). But cf
Mengler, supra note 41, at 427-31 (arguing that Federal Rules were drafted with the aim of simplify-
ing law of evidence).
62. FED. R. EvID. 104(b).
63. As an illustration of the type of evidence that does not raise issues of conditional relevance,
the Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 104(b) mentions testimony in a murder case that on the day
before the murder, the defendant bought a weapon of the type used in the killing. FED. R. EVID.
104(b) advisory committee's note. Even in that case, however, the conditional relevance problems
disappear only if the prosecutor has already introduced evidence describing the murder weapon and
establishing the date of the killing. Cf Ball, The Myth of Conditional Relevancy, 14 GA. L. REV.
435, 440 n.9 (1980) (defendant's purchase of weapon on day prior to murder irrelevant unless de-
fendant used gun to kill victim).
64. Ball, supra note 63, at 469; see also C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5052, at 248 (1977) (describing Rule 104(b) as "a provision that is best
ignored"); Ball, supra note 63, at 454 (referring to conditional relevance rule as "a rescue apparatus
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Likewise, the commentators have been baffled by the question
whether a mother's out-of-court declaration that "Harriet is the finest of
my daughters" is properly considered hearsay. Some argue that the
statement is not hearsay because it is offered as circumstantial evidence
of the mother's feelings toward Harriet, rather than for the truth of the
matter asserted (that Harriet is in fact the finest of her daughters).65
Others, however, consider the remark hearsay because it is indistinguish-
able from the statement "I think Harriet is the finest of my daughters"
and is offered to prove the truth of that assertion.66
Finally, the line between evidence of habit, which is admissible to
prove a propensity to act in a certain fashion,67 and evidence of charac-
ter, which generally is not admissible for that purpose,68 is almost impos-
sible to draw.6 9 The Advisory Committee suggested that character refers
to " 'a generalized description of one's disposition, or of one's disposition
in respect to a general trait, such as honesty, temperance, or peaceful-
ness.' "70 Habit, on the other hand, is " 'more specific' "; " 'it describes
one's regular response to a repeated specific situation.' "71 But the Advi-
sory Committee also conceded that "'[c]haracter and habit are close
akin,' "72 and its general definitions do not resolve questions such as the
permissibility of introducing testimony that the defendant in a tort suit
previously started three fires when she fell asleep while smoking when
offered to suggest that the fire that destroyed the plaintiff's property was
caused in like fashion. A tendency to fall asleep while smoking is not a
general personality trait and therefore does not seem to qualify as charac-
ter evidence, but the defendant did not fall asleep while smoking often or
regularly enough to constitute a habit.73
intended to save the administration of the law of evidence from ... mythical dangers" that instead
"confuse[s] the jury and muddle[s] the administration of the evidence rules far more than letting
matters alone would have done").
65. See R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE: TEXT,
PROBLEMS, TRANSCRIPTS AND CASES 362-64 (2d ed. 1982); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 294, at
843 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter MCCORMICK]; MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 249, at 590-91
(E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972).
66. Cf M. GRAHAM, supra note 39, at 91-92; 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 417, at 120-21 (1980).
Under the latter theory, the statement nevertheless would be admissible under the hearsay ex-
ception for statements of a declarant's then-existing state of mind. See FED. R. EVID. 803(3).
Although both groups ultimately would admit the statement, making the debate largely theoretical,
"the confusion that broad use of the concept of circumstantial evidence creates in the overall analysis
of hearsay versus not hearsay remains." M. GRAHAM, supra note 39, at 92.
67. See FED. R. EVID. 406.
68. See id. 404(a).
69. But see Mengler, supra note 41, at 423 (suggesting that "[tihe scarcity of published opin-
ions construing the habit rule suggests courts were not having much trouble drawing the
distinction").
70. FED. R. EVID. 406 advisory committee's note (quoting C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 162, at 340-41 (1954)).
71. Id. (quoting C. MCCORMICK, supra note 70, at 341).
72. Id. (quoting C. MCCORMICK, supra note 70, at 340).
73. This problem comes from E. GREEN & C. NESSON, PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS
ON EVIDENCE 138 (1983). Green and Nesson believe that FED. R. EVID. 403's general standard for
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The complexity in the rules ensures that they are understood only
by lawyers-more specifically, by those lawyers who litigate on a regular
basis. Litigants are likely to find the rules incomprehensible, thereby
alienating them from the trial process and contributing to their impres-
sion that they lack any real control over their case.74 If the legal system
wants litigants to feel satisfied that justice has been done, perhaps the
rules of evidence should be more accessible to the average person. Like-
wise, if it is interested in finding truth and doing justice, rather than
merely resolving disputes, perhaps the rules should focus more on facili-
tating the introduction of crucial testimony than on determining whether
it has satisfied each of the technical requirements for admission."
Although the law of evidence can be made less inaccessible and
therefore less hierarchical by eliminating some of the needless complexity
in the rules, the most straightforward approach to evidence would be to
give the judge or jury complete discretion, which is problematic for the
reasons outlined above.76 Moreover, additional rules may be necessary
to eliminate the gender bias in the current evidence codes, even though
promulgating new rules will add to the complexity of evidentiary doc-
trine. For example, the law governing the admissibility of character evi-
dence would be less complex if rape shield laws had never been enacted,
but such statutes are necessary to respect the autonomy of women, pro-
tect rape victims from unnecessary trauma, and encourage women to re-
port rape charges." Likewise, analyzing the law of privileges from a
feminist perspective may suggest the need for additional privileges,78
which will add complexity to the current law. In an imperfect world,
however, complexity may be necessary in the short run to protect the
interests of women.
C The Adversarial Nature of the Law of Evidence
Perhaps most fundamentally, feminists would question the rules of
evidence to the extent that they presuppose an adversarial environment
and therefore reflect male values of individual autonomy, competition,
and aggressiveness. Leslie Bender has described the "competitive, spar-
balancing probative value and prejudice governs this question because the evidence falls in "an unde-
fined middle" ground between habit and character. See E. GREEN & C. NESSON, TEACHER'S MAN-
UAL FOR PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 11-27 to -28 (1983) [hereinafter E.
GREEN & C. NESSON, TEACHER'S MANUAL]; see also Mengler, supra note 41, at 416-25 (noting that
Advisory Committee Note to FED. R. EvID. 406 gives conflicting signals as to whether or not habit
must be nonvolitional or semiautomatic to qualify under Rule 406 and thus allows trial judges dis-
cretion in defining admissible habit evidence).
74. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 61, at 403; cf Korn, supra note 38, at 102 (suggesting that
parties may prefer arbitration because it gives them sense of having "some control over the
process").
75. Cf Tanford, supra note 41, at 846 ("[t]rials appear less concerned with truth than with
proof-whether the parties can satisfy the rules of a closed system") (emphasis deleted).
76. See supra notes 42-55 and accompanying text.
77. See infra notes 146-52 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 162-67 and accompanying text.
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ring style" of the adversary system as "an intellectualized substitute for
duelling or medieval jousting."7 9 Carrie Menkel-Meadow has observed
that "[t]he conduct of litigation is relatively similar . . . to a sporting
event-there are rules, a referee, an object to the game, and a winner. "80
The rules of evidence contribute to this image, encouraging attorneys to
find devious ways to introduce inadmissible evidence damaging to the
opponent's case while excluding admissible evidence detrimental to their
own case.
For example, the Federal Rules prevent the prosecutor from using
evidence of a defendant's criminal record to show propensity-that is, to
suggest that the defendant is the type of person who would have commit-
ted the crime charged.8 ' But such evidence is admissible when offered to
prove intent-that is, to suggest that the defendant's prior illicit intent
makes it more likely that her state of mind was similar at the time of the
alleged crime.8 2 Likewise, the plaintiff in a tort suit may introduce testi-
mony that the defendant repaired the defect that caused the plaintiff's
injuries if offered to show something other than "negligence or culpable
conduct" on the part of the defendant.83 Given the obvious impact such
evidence will have on a jury, and the jury's inability to consider the testi-
mony only for the permissible purpose,84 attorneys have a real incentive
79. Bender, supra note 32, at 7.
80. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 40, at 51; see also Frug, supra note 33, at 1133.
81. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a).
82. See, e.g., United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 911, 916 (5th Cir. 1978) (interpreting
FED. R. EVID. 404(b)), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979); 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note
66, § 140, at 225; see also FED. R. EvID. 404(b) (permitting evidence of prior crimes for other
purposes as well, including "motive, opportunity . . . preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident"). The Beechum dissent criticized the majority for permitting the
prosecution to introduce a defendant's prior convictions so long as the judge "metaphysically classi-
fies the question as propensity to intend rather than as propensity to commit." 582 F.2d at 921
(Goldberg, J., dissenting).
83. See FED. R. EvID. 407 (permitting evidence of subsequent repairs if offered to impeach
defense witness or to establish feasibility of precautionary measures or defendant's ownership of or
control over cause of accident); see also FED. R. EvID. 408 (permitting plaintiff to present testimony
that defendant offered to settle case if offered for some purpose other than proving defendant's liabil-
ity for the claim, such as suggesting witness's bias or prejudice, rebutting allegation of "undue de-
lay," or proving obstruction of criminal investigation); FED. R. EVID. 409 (excluding evidence of
offer to pay medical expenses if introduced to show liability); FED. R. EVID. 411 (evidence of insur-
ance inadmissible if offered to show negligence or wrongful conduct, but admissible to prove
"agency, ownership, or control, or bias or prejudice of a witness").
The policy considerations underlying these exclusionary rules-the fear that people will not
repair defects or offer to compromise disputed claims if evidence of their generosity can be used
against them, see FED. R. EVID. 407-409 advisory committee's notes-themselves seem to reflect a
male perspective. Although consistent with the feminist's goal of taking responsibility for others, the
presumption that the law of evidence must encourage that sense of responsibility assumes a male
approach to relationships.
84. See, e.g., 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 66, § 140, at 193-94 (most defendants
whose prior crimes have been introduced do not seek limiting instructions "for obvious reasons"); id.
§ 165, at 389 (although defendant in personal injury case can request limiting instruction when
evidence of subsequent repair has been introduced, that option "would seem to offer even less in the
way of comfort"); Tanford, supra note 41, at 867-69 & n.248. See generally Krulewitch v. United
States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("The naive assumption that prejudicial
effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury, all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated
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to attempt to squeeze the evidence into one of the categories of permissi-
ble use-and they usually succeed.85
The adversarial nature of the litigation process also encourages law-
yers to use tactics to intimidate opposing counsel and her witnesses, hop-
ing to rattle them so that they will be unable to effectively present their
evidence, or at least will appear less credible and competent in the jury's
eyes. For example, attorneys may object to every question that is not
phrased in precisely proper form.86 They may feed on the jury's ten-
dency to view women as less credible than men by calling female (but not
male) witnesses by their first names,87 or by taking advantage of inaccu-
rate stereotypes about rape victims 8 or battered women. 9 Or they may
make condescending or inappropriate comments to opposing counsel
who are women, giving the jurors the distinct impression that they need
fiction.") (citation omitted); 1 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 66, § 45, at 344-46. The
idea that people can compartmentalize their thought processes to consider evidence only for one
purpose and not for others is itself an abstract, artificial notion that does not accord with reality and
seems to reflect a male perspective.
85. Although judges have discretion to exclude such evidence if it is unduly prejudicial, see
FED. R. EvID. 403; 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 66, § 140, at 190-91; id. § 165, at
398-99, they typically choose to admit it. See id. § 140, at 172 ("[so frequent is the use of evidence
of other acts and crimes for such purposes that it would be both fair and clearer to state the operative
principle [of Rule 404] as one of inclusion, as many courts do"); id. § 165, at 389 ("[slo numerous
are the purposes beyond reach of the exclusionary principle, and so often is evidence of subsequent
measures admitted, that a perusal of the cases is enough to prove that Rule 407 seldom requires
actual exclusion of evidence").
86. For example, leading questions usually are not permissible on direct examination, see FED.
R. EvID. 611(c), but "almost any... type of question may be leading or not, depending upon the
content and context." MCCORMICK, supra note 65, § 6, at 11.
87. See, e.g., Eich, Gender Bias in the Courtroom: Some Participants Are More Equal than
Others, 69 JUDICATURE 339, 340 (1986); Report of the New York Task Force on Women in the
Courts, supra note 22, at 113-23, 125-26; Schafran, supra note 22, at 15-16.
Trial judges can discourage such tactics by using their power to "exercise reasonable control
over the mode ... of interrogating witnesses" so as to "make the interrogation ... effective for the
ascertainment of truth" and "protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment." FED. R.
EVID. 611(a). Often, however, judges do not intervene. See Report of the New York Task Force on
Women in the Courts, supra note 22, at 145.
88. Common myths about rape include, for example, the belief that many rape charges are
unfounded, that most rapes are committed by strangers, and that rape victims are at least partially
responsible for the assault if they were hitchhiking, drinking in a bar, or dating the defendant at the
time. See, e.g., ILLINOIs TASK FORCE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS, supra note 22, at 104-06,
108; Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 13-14, 25-30 (1977); Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1171-73 (1986); LaFree, Reskin & Visher,
Jurors' Response to Victim's Behavior in Sexual Assault Trials, 34 SOc. PROBS. 4 (1985); Massaro,
Experts Psychology, Credibility, and Rape: The Rape Trauma Syndrome Issue and Its Implications
for Expert Psychological Testimony, 69 MINN. L. REV. 395, 402-23, 442-43 (1985); Report of the New
York Task Force on Women in the Courts, supra note 22, at 53-55, 62-63; Schafran, supra note 22, at
48-50; Note, The Empirical. Historical and Legal Case Against the Cautionary Instruction: A Call for
Legislative Reform, 1988 DUKE L.J. 154, 161-63 [hereinafter Note, The Case Against the Cautionary
Instruction]; Comment, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony in Intrafamily Child Sexual Abuse
Cases, 34 UCLA L. REV. 175, 178-80 (1986) [hereinafter Comment, The Admissibility of Expert
Testimony].
89. Common myths about domestic violence include, for example, the belief that a woman who
was really subjected to serious abuse would have left the relationship, that the woman must have
done something to deserve the abuse, and that only men of lower socioeconomic status and limited
education beat their wives. See, e.g., Kinports, supra note 26, at 398-407.
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not take female attorneys seriously either.'
These efforts to present prejudicial evidence and to subvert the op-
ponent's case are not likely to contribute to accurate fact-finding. A legal
system more consistent with feminist values of cooperation and responsi-
bility to others would not tolerate such a litigation process because it
"impedes not only 'the supposed search for truth' but also the expression
of concern for the person on the other side." 91
Within the confines of the current adversary system, however, an
attorney who unilaterally chooses to follow a feminist model of litigation
is likely to find her opponent continuing to act in the more traditional,
competitive style and attempting to take advantage of her. Her obliga-
tion to serve her client's interests may therefore collide with her attempts
to cooperate with the other side. Additional rules could be promulgated
to require all attorneys to act in a more cooperative fashion, but it is
difficult to legislate a sense of responsibility to others and increasing the
number of rules governing the litigation process also adds to its complex-
ity. Without massive restructuring of the adversary system, therefore,
the feminist ideal of a more cooperative litigation process is unlikely to be
realized in the short term.
D. The Formal Nature of the Law of Evidence
A final characteristic of the current adversary process, as reinforced
by the rules of evidence, is its formality. The courtroom setting is austere
and imposing, the procedures traditional and ritualistic. Ostensibly in-
tended to impress the litigants and the public with the solemnity of the
occasion and the authority and wisdom of the tribunal, 92 traditional legal
theorists might also believe that this formality actually advances the
truth-seeking process.
A feminist approach, on the other hand, would question whether
formality might instead hinder accurate fact-finding and preclude more
cooperative methods of resolving disputes that could lead to results satis-
factory to both parties. For example, studies suggest that a victim of
child abuse may be more willing to testify in less intimidating surround-
ings.93 Similarly, the interests of justice might be better served in domes-
90. See, e.g., Eich, supra note 87, at 340-41; Hodgson & Pryor, Sex Discrimination in the
Courtroom: Attorney Gender and Credibility, WOMEN LAW. J., Winter 1985, at 7, 7; Report of the
New York Task Force on Women in the Courts, supra note 22, at 126-46; Schafran, Abilities v. As-
sumptions: Women as Litigators, 19 TRIAL, Aug. 1983, at 36, 38-39; Note, Preventing Gender Bias in
the Courts: A Question of Judicial Ethics, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 775, 780-87 (1988).
91. C. GILLIGAN, supra note 27, at 135; see also Tanford, supra note 41, at 850 ("The more
fundamental characteristic of our trial system is in fact its adversarial structure, not its commitment
to accurate results.").
92. See R. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 127 (1990); cf Tanford, supra note
41, at 857 (trials serve "an important social symbolic function" by "help[ing] define the limits of
acceptable social conduct" and "reinforcing community behavioral and moral norms").
93. See, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3167-69 (1990); Saunders, The Child Sexual
Abuse Case: A Short Course for Judges, JUDGES' J., Winter 1988, at 20, 41; Note, Videotaping Chil-
dren's Testimony. An Empirical View, 85 MIcH. L. REV. 809, 810-25 (1987).
[Vol. 1991
EVIDENCE ENGENDERED
tic violence cases if a battered woman seeking a protective order were
accompanied by an advocate, even one not licensed to practice law, so
that she did not have to face her abusive husband alone.94
Closely connected to the formality of the litigation process is the
starring role given the attorneys. Although in theory the trial is intended
to aid the jurors in ascertaining the truth, they are usually not invited to
ask the questions they deem relevant to their decision.9" Similarly, if one
of the goals of the trial process is to make litigants feel as though they
received their "day in court," they should be allowed to question wit-
nesses or otherwise participate meaningfully in the process. As Carrie
Menkel-Meadow has observed, "direct communication" might be prefer-
able to "third party mediated debate" because "two apparently conflict-
ing positions can both be simultaneously legitimate, and there need not
be a single victor."96
In the past, however, more informal procedures have served to dis-
advantage women. For example, the mediation model, where a third
person acts to encourage communication between the parties in an effort
to enable them to solve the problem themselves, has been used in divorce,
custody, and domestic violence cases. Because it is aimed at achieving
compromise, "[t]he basic predicate of successful mediation is equality of
bargaining power between the parties."97 Given the disparity in power
between women and men, mediation has given men a competitive advan-
tage when more formal procedures might have better protected women.98
Fundamental changes in the formality of the litigation process
94. See Note, Starting a TRO Project: Student Representation of Battered Women, 96 YALE
L.J. 1985, 1991 (1987); cf Germane, Johnson & Lemon, Mandatory Custody Mediation and Joint
Custody Orders in California: The Dangers for Victims of Domestic Violence, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S
L.J. 175, 188 (1985) (battered women are reluctant to speak in mediation proceedings); Lerman,
Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57, 91 (1984) (same).
95. See MCCORMICK, supra note 65, § 8, at 14-15 & n.4.
96. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 40, at 51-52; see also Resnik, supra note 43, at 1908.
97. Report of the New York Task Force on Women in the Courts, supra note 22, at 46.
98. Mediation has proven unsatisfactory for women involved in divorce or custody disputes for
a number of reasons: the imbalance in financial resources gives the woman an incentive to accept a
less favorable settlement in order to avoid costly litigation; mediation results more frequently in joint
custody because the goal is compromise, rather than the best interests of the child; the woman's
natural desire to be conciliatory may lead her to accept a less favorable outcome; and the mediation
process is not bound by precedent, so that the results may be inequitable or unenforceable. See, e.g.,
Erlanger, Chambliss & Melli, supra note 47; Lefcourt, supra note 47; Resnik, supra note 43, at 1940-
43; Woods, Mediation: A Backlash to Women's Progress on Family Law Issues, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 431, 435-36 (1985).
An abusive relationship involves an especially serious imbalance of power. In addition, media-
tion has not helped the battered woman because she may be afraid to speak openly during the media-
tion sessions, and, by seeking a compromise outcome, the mediation process does not hold the abuser
accountable or unequivocally condemn his conduct. See, e.g., ATrORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE
ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 51, at 23-24; U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 51, at
61-76; Germane, Johnson & Lemon, supra note 94; Lerman, supra note 94.
Nevertheless, some feminists believe that mediation may be preferable to adversarial litigation.
See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 40, at 52-53 & n.78; Rifkin, Mediation from a Feminist Perspective:
Promise and Problems, 2 LAW & INEQUALITY 21 (1984).
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therefore cannot be accomplished in a world of unequal bargaining
power without harming the interests of women. Less drastic reforms,
like making the trial less intimidating for child witnesses or permitting
advocates to accompany battered women in court can, however, be ef-
fected in the short term.
Adopting even more informal procedures in the context of an adju-
dicative proceeding may not have the same drawbacks as fundamental
changes in the litigation process: disputes can be resolved even in the
absence of a compromise agreeable to both parties, and disparities in bar-
gaining power may therefore have less impact on the outcome of an adju-
dicative proceeding. On the other hand, a more informal adjudicative
process may give lawyers greater rein to engage in the abusive behaviors
described above. Until lawyers are willing to act to further feminist prin-
ciples of cooperation, more formal procedures may be necessary.
Although a feminist approach to the law of evidence would ideally
construct a system that valued context over abstractness, accessibility
over hierarchy, cooperation over competition, and informality over for-
mality, none of those ideals can be realized within the confines of a legal
system so firmly rooted in traditional male norms. Attempting to fully
implement those goals at this time would ultimately redound to the detri-
ment of women. Therefore, a more pragmatic feminist approach to the
law of evidence, which exposes the ways in which the current evidentiary
rules incorporate a male perspective and then proposes reforms that re-
flect the perspectives and interests of women, appears to be the best
short-term solution. The following discussion analyzes a number of spe-
cific evidentiary rules from that pragmatic perspective.
III. A FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF SPECIFIC EVIDENTIARY DOCTRINES
A pragmatic feminist approach to the law of evidence must, first,
propose changes to evidence rules that expressly discriminate against wo-
men, as well as those that, though apparently neutral, have a disparate
impact on women. Second, it must criticize rules that reflect male values
and ideals and therefore subordinate or simply ignore other perspectives.
Finally, it must determine whether any aspects of the feminist ideals of
context, accessibility, cooperation, and informality can be built into the
current rules without disadvantaging women.
A. Relevance and Prejudice
The Federal Rules consider evidence relevant if it has "any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determina-
tion of the action more or less probable than it would be without the
evidence."99 The accompanying Advisory Committee Note instructs
trial judges to use "principles evolved by experience or science, applied
99. FED. R. EviD. 401.
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logically to the situation at hand" to determine the relevance of a given
piece of evidence."
Though seemingly neutral and impartial, relevance is in fact in the
eye of the beholder. The assumption that judges can logically determine
whether testimony has the requisite connection to the issues in the case
"presuppose[s] the universality of a particular reference point or stand-
point"; 0 ' whether or not one considers a fact pertinent depends in large
part on her particular point of view and life experiences. As one of the
standard evidence treatises explains, "the answer [to relevance questions]
must lie in the judge's own experience, his general knowledge, and his
understanding of human conduct and motivation.' 02 Leaving relevance
determinations to trial judges, most of whom are privileged white men,
therefore leads to rulings that reflect that group's limited "experience,"
"knowledge," and "understanding," and necessarily solidifies a white
male perspective to questions of relevance.
For example, in People v. Adamson, l"3 a celebrated murder trial in
California, the prosecutor sought to introduce evidence that the tops of
three women's stockings were discovered in the defendant's room. One
of the victim's stockings was missing and the top of the other had been
torn off, but none of the stockings found in the defendant's room
matched the torn stocking. The trial court nevertheless admitted the evi-
dence, and the California Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the
defendant's "interest in women's stocking tops ... tend[ed] to identify
[him] as the person who removed the stockings from the victim."" ° This
conclusion may seem perfectly logical unless one realizes that Adamson
was black and that many black men wore stocking tops at that time to
straighten their hair." 5 Considering the case from the perspective of
people of color thus substantially undercuts the probative value of the
evidence. When viewed in this light, the discovery of the stocking tops
no more identified the defendant as the murderer than would the discov-
ery of razor blades in the home of a person suspected of committing a
murder with a razor blade of a different type.10 6
100. Id. advisory committee's note.
101. Minow, supra note 4, at 48.
102. MCCORMICK, supra note 65, § 185, at 544; see also Ball, supra note 63, at 461-62 (judge
determines relevance "by a form of judicial notice, drawing on what he knows as a reasonable judge
about the behavior of the universe, including the humans in it").
103. 27 Cal. 2d 478, 165 P.2d 3 (1946), aff'd sub nom. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46
(1947).
104. Id. at 485, 165 P.2d at 7.
105. I am grateful to Eric Green and Charles Nesson for this insight. See E. GREEN & C.
NESSON, TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra note 73, at 1-31.
106. Elaine Shoben deserves the credit for this analogy.
Although defense counsel could have tried to explain Adamson's possession of the stocking
tops, nothing in any of the reported opinions indicates that the attorney thought to make this argu-
ment. In any event, the point is that trial judges exclude evidence in other cases when their world
view suggests that it is irrelevant, even though opposing counsel could raise alternate explanations
for the evidence in those cases as well.
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Similarly, evidence that a rape victim did not immediately report the
crime may seem to cast doubt on the victim's credibility-if viewed from
the perspective of a man who does not hesitate to assert his legal rights
and has confidence in our law enforcement and criminal justice sys-
tems.10 7 A woman, however, is often socialized to believe that she is at
least partly at fault for sexual assault: she must have led him on.'
Even if a rape victim rejects that myth herself, she may be afraid that
others who hear of the charges will blame her. Moreover, reporting the
rape requires her to endure searching and often hostile examination by
the police and prosecutor; to relive the horror of the experience over and
over again; and to face skepticism by the judge and jury, perhaps ulti-
mately leading to an acquittal or a very light sentence. " Therefore,
when viewed from the woman's perspective, a rape victim's delay in com-
ing forward may suggest little about the credibility of the charges."10
Just as some evidence may appear less relevant if viewed from a
different perspective, other evidence may seem more relevant. Katharine
Bartlett has explained why incorporating a feminist perspective may en-
hance the probative value of certain evidence: "feminist practical reason-
ing deems relevant facts related to the woman question-facts about
whose interests particular rules or legal resolutions reflect and whose in-
terests require more deliberate attention."' "'
107. See, e.g., People v. Vaughn, 390 Ill. 360, 365, 61 N.E.2d 546, 548 (1945) (reasoning that "a
woman thus wronged will be prompted to express her indignation at the injury inflicted upon her");
State v. Ciskie, 110 Wash. 2d 263, 275, 751 P.2d 1165, 1171 (1988). In fact, the Model Penal Code
prohibits the prosecution of rape charges unless the crime was brought "to the notice of the public
authority" within three months. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(4) (Official Draft and Revised Com-
ments 1980); see also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:7 (1986) (six-month time limit for reporting
rapes of victims over 18 years old). Although most states do not follow the Model Penal Code
approach, the courts do admit evidence regarding the timing of the victim's complaint. See Note, A
Matter of Time: Evidence of a Victim's Prompt Complaint in New York, 53 BROOKLYN L. REV.
1087, 1087-88 & nn.2 & 6, 1091-92 (1988) [hereinafter Note, A Matter of Time]; Note, Defining the
Boundaries of Admissible Expert Psychological Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome, 1989 U. ILL.
L. REV. 691, 695 & n.34 [hereinafter Note, Defining the Boundaries].
108. See, e.g., Massaro, supra note 88, at 423; Note, A Matter of Time, supra note 107, at 1106;
Note, The Case Against the Cautionary Instruction, supra note 88, at 158-59; Comment, The Admis-
sibility of Expert Testimony, supra note 88, at 182-88.
109. See, e.g., ILLINOIS TASK FORCE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS, supra note 22, at 100;
Berger, supra note 88, at 6, 24, 30; Griffin, Rape: The All-American Crime, in THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM AND WOMEN 223, 230-33 (1982); Massaro, supra note 88, at 422-23; Robin, Forci-
ble Rape: Institutionalized Sexism in the Criminal Justice System, 23 CRIME & DELINQ. 136, 137
(1977); Note, A Matter of Time, supra note 107, at 1102, 1106 n. 120; Note, The Case Against the
Cautionary Instruction, supra note 88, at 158-59; Comment, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony,
supra note 88, at 182-88.
110. Although considering the perspectives of others in making relevance determinations may
lead to the exclusion of some evidence that would seem relevant to a traditional white male judge,
that result is not inconsistent with contextual reasoning. Contextual reasoning makes the context of
the case important, but the relevant context does not necessarily include any evidence a litigant
might want to introduce. In the examples cited in the text, for instance, putting the case in context
makes certain evidence less relevant. Thus, following the feminist model of contextual reasoning
does not mean that all evidentiary disputes are automatically resolved in favor of admitting the
evidence.
111. Bartlett, supra note 31, at 856-57; cf Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A
Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2428 (1989) (courts "use existing statutory and case law
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For example, the feminist perspective would find a rape defendant's
prior abuse of the victim relevant to the question whether she voluntarily
consented to intercourse at the time of the alleged rape. Considering the
context of the violent relationship between the victim and the defendant,
as well as the nature of sexual relationships between women and men in
general, helps to establish that the woman was acting to avoid further
injury and was not voluntarily consenting."1 2 Likewise, if a black defend-
ant who had been sentenced to death in connection with the murder of a
white person challenged the sentence on equal protection grounds, a fem-
inist approach would look beyond the motives of the one jury that sen-
tenced the defendant and take into account the historical context in
which the case occurred. 'Statistical evidence showing that blacks who
kill whites are significantly more likely to receive a death sentence than
are defendants in other murder cases would therefore be relevant.' 1
3
Finally, the feminist perspective would suggest that the so-called
"day in the life" film, which depicts the life of the plaintiff in a personal
injury case, has substantial probative value. Although such films give the
jury a more vivid picture of the impact of the plaintiff's injuries than oral
testimony or even photographs could provide, some courts have excluded
them on the grounds that they are of limited relevance' 4 or that they
constitute out-of-court statements not subject to cross-examination.' " A
feminist approach, by contrast, would admit such evidence because it
tends to focus the jury's attention on the real-life context of the case and
thus emphasizes the interests of the parties rather than the abstract legal
issues. 1
6
The danger that judicial bias and narrow perspective may lead
as a type of 'screen' that makes certain facts relevant and others not"; "[p]utting the facts in the
linguistic code required by the court sterilize[s] them," "strip[s] [them] of the features that gave
[them] meaning" to the litigants, and deprives them of their "power to outrage").
112. See Estrich, supra note 88, at 1108-09, 1111-12. But cf State v. Alston, 310 N.C. 399, 409,
312 S.E.2d 470, 476 (1984) (finding that intercourse was against victim's will, but that defendant had
not used force or threat of force because "[a]lthough [the victim's] general fear of the defendant may
have been justified by his conduct on prior occasions .... such general fear was not sufficient to show
that the defendant used the force required to support a conviction of rape").
113. But cf. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987) (rejecting equal protection claim
because statistics are "clearly insufficient to support an inference that any of the decisionmakers in
[this] case acted with discriminatory purpose").
Last year, the habeas reform package passed in the House included a provision that would have
overruled McCleskey. See 136 CONG. REC. H9001-11 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1990). The Senate, however,
voted against a similar provision. See id. at S6884-6910 (daily ed. May 24, 1990). The conferees
were unable to reach a compromise between the House and Senate versions of the bill, and habeas
reform therefore died at the end of the session. See id. at S17,602 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (remarks
of Sen. Thurmond).
114. See Note, Beyond Words. The Evidentiary Status of "Day in the Life" Films, 66 B.U.L.
REV. 133, 137-38 (1986) (describing cases) [hereinafter Note, Beyond Words]; Comment, Plaintiffs'
Use of "Day in the Life"Films: A New Look at the Celluloid Witness, 49 UMKC L. REV. 179, 183-
84 & nn.38-39 (1981) (citing cases).
115. See Note, Beyond Words, supra note 114, at 143-47 (describing cases).
116. A number of courts have admitted day-in-the-life films. See, e.g., Pisel v. Stamford Hosp.,
180 Conn. 314, 323-24, 430 A.2d 1, 8 (1980); Georgacopoulos v. University of Chicago Hosps. &
Clinics, 152 Il. App. 3d 596, 599, 504 N.E.2d 830, 832-33, 105 Ill. Dec. 545, 547 (1987); Baren-
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judges to underestimate the value of certain evidence may not seem par-
ticularly troubling because the definition of "relevance" in the Federal
Rules is a fairly liberal one. The Federal Rules operate on the theory
that "[a] brick is not a wall,""' 7 and a piece of evidence therefore need
not make the proponent's theory of the case more probable than not, but
only "more probable .. .than it would be without the evidence.""' 8
Even if evidence can easily satisfy this low threshold of relevance, how-
ever, it will be excluded if its probative value is "substantially outweighed
by the danger of undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of unfair delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.""''
This balancing approach is consistent with feminist principles in the
sense that it permits the judge to make rulings about relevance and preju-
dice based on the context of the specific case. In applying the balancing
test, however, the judge's individual perspective will be crucial in mea-
suring precisely how much probative value the evidence has and how
likely it is to prejudice the jury. The outcome of the balancing process
may well vary depending on the judge's background and outlook;' 20 leav-
ing determinations of relevance and prejudice to the broad discretion of
the trial judge therefore tends to incorporate a white male perspective in
these areas.
In general, however, the balancing approach is consistent with con-
textual reasoning and would comport with feminist values if judges rec-
ognized the narrowness of their own experiences and tried to consider
the perspectives of others in analyzing issues of probative value and prej-
udice. Although any one judge's experiences are necessarily limited, di-
versifying the judiciary will help incorporate the perspectives of others
because, as Martha Minow has observed, "[tihe more powerful we are,
the less we may be able to see that the world coincides with our view
precisely because we shaped it in accordance with those views." 121
brugge v. Rich, 141 Ill. App. 3d 1046, 1055-56, 490 N.E.2d 1368, 1375, 96 Ill. Dec. 163, 169-70
(1986); Air Shields, Inc. v. Spears, 590 S.W.2d 574, 580 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
117. MCCORMICK, supra note 65, § 185, at 543.
118. FED. R. EVID. 401.
119. Id. 403.
120. See Mengler, supra note 41, at 414, 440, 445 (describing balancing process as "nebulous
inquiry into the minds of a handful of lay people [that] involves a great deal of guesswork"; "modelfl
of indeterminacy"; and inquiry that turns on "gut reactions"); Tanford, supra note 41, at 833
("[a]ssigning the initial weights to an item's probative value and prejudicial effect is... a question of
personal bias"; judges are then asked to perform "metaphysical task of balancing incommensurable
qualities"); Teitelbaum, Sutton-Barbere & Johnson, Evaluating the Prejudicial Effect of Evidence:
Can Judges Identify the Impact of Improper Evidence on Juries?, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 1147, 1163-73
(finding that lawyers, and therefore presumably judges as well, have very different views concerning
prejudicial effect of specific evidence).
121. Minow, supra note 30, at 73.
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B. Character and Competence
By presuming that every witness is competent to testify, 22 the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence depart from the common-law approach, which
automatically disqualified certain categories of witnesses. For example,
no party or interested person was allowed to testify.123 The spouse of a
party or interested person likewise was barred from testifying, on the
theory that a wife had no identity independent of her husband.12 If he
was an incompetent witness, she must necessarily have been as well.
Even under the modern approach of presumed competency, the trial
judge may exclude evidence on competence grounds if no reasonable ju-
ror would believe the witness's testimony. In implementing this strict
standard, the judge is really determining minimum credibility rather
than competency.' 25 Given the common perception that women are less
capable, less rational, and therefore less credible than men,' 2 6 the stan-
dard is susceptible to gendered application. In fact, however, judges sel-
dom find witnesses incompetent to testify;127  any gender bias in
perceptions of credibility is therefore likely to have its greatest impact
when the jury is deliberating, and not when the judge is determining
competency. Nevertheless, further empirical research should be under-
taken to determine whether judicial findings of incompetence tend to dis-
criminate against women.
The common law also barred convicted felons from testifying. 28
The Federal Rules contain no such outright prohibition but instead allow
evidence of a witness's prior convictions in certain circumstances. 129 For
instance, a criminal defendant's prior felony convictions are admissible to
impeach her testimony so long as their probative value outweighs their
prejudicial effect to the defendant.' 30
Potential witnesses, especially criminal defendants, are likely to be
122. See FED. R. EvID. 601.
123. See id. advisory committee's note.
124. See id.; 3 D. LouISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 66, § 251, at 15.
125. See 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 601[01], at 601-9 to -I1
(1990).
126. See, e.g., Olsen, supra note 37, at 1575-76; Report of the New York Task Force on Women
in the Courts, supra note 22, at 113-18; Schafran, supra note 22, at 16; see also infra note 206 and
accompanying text. Doubts about the credibility of poor women and women of color are especially
problematic. See Report of the New York Task Force on Women in the Courts, supra note 22, at 121-
22.
127. See FED. R. EvID. 601 advisory committee's note.
128. See 3 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 66, § 251, at 13-14.
129. See FED. R. EVID. 609; see also id. 608(b) (permitting cross-examination concerning wit-
ness's prior acts of untruthfulness that did not lead to conviction).
130. See FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1). Under recent amendments to Rule 609, see infra note 134,
the balancing test described in the text applies only when a prosecutor seeks to introduce a criminal
defendant's prior felony convictions. Prior felonies committed by other witnesses are evaluated
under the less restrictive standard set out in Rule 403, which excludes evidence only if its "probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." FED. R. EViD. 403 (emphasis
added).
The other type of convictions admitted under Rule 609 are those that "involved dishonesty or
false statement, regardless of the punishment." Id. 609(a)(2).
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intimidated by the threatened disclosure of their prior convictions and
may choose not to testify-even though a criminal defendant's decision
not to testify may decrease the likelihood of acquittal. 31 A feminist ap-
proach to evidence would tend to be more concerned about justice to the
parties and the feelings of the witnesses and therefore would question the
practice of admitting prior felonies of limited relevance to truthfulness-
for example, evidence of a defense witness's sodomy conviction in a trial
involving charges that the defendant mailed a threatening letter 132 or of a
defendant's conviction for possession of a small amount of heroin in a
trial on theft charges 133-when their introduction would discourage the
presentation of crucial testimony or unnecessarily embarrass the
witness. 134
131. See, e.g., 3 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 66, § 315, at 316-18.
132. See United States v. Blankenship, 870 F.2d 326, 328-29 (6th Cir. 1988).
133. See United States v. Barnes, 622 F.2d 107, 108-09 (5th Cir. 1980); see also United States v.
Booker, 706 F.2d 860, 862-63 (8th Cir.) (admitting evidence of defendant's three prior firearms
convictions despite his offer to stipulate to those convictions in trial involving charges of possession
of firearm by convicted felon), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 917 (1983).
134. The trial judge has discretion to exclude a witness's prior convictions to protect her from
"harassment or undue embarrassment." FED. R. EvID. 611(a). The cases described in the text
demonstrate, however, that this discretion is not exercised in all cases where the prior felony is of
limited relevance to truthfulness.
In some respects, the Federal Rules may seem to be moving in the direction advocated in the
text: a recent amendment to the Rules makes clear that in some circumstances the judge must
consider prejudice to the witness and all the parties, not merely the defendant in a criminal case, in
determining the admissibility of a witness's prior felony convictions.
As originally adopted, the Federal Rules provided that felony convictions could be used to
impeach a witness's testimony if the court concluded that "the probative value of admitting this
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant." FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1) (emphasis ad-
ded). The Supreme Court interpreted this language literally to refer only to prejudice to criminal
defendants, thus requiring the admission of prior felony convictions if the potential prejudice would
affect the witness, the prosecution, or either party in a civil suit. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach.
Co., 109 S. Ct. 1981 (1989).
Last year, the Supreme Court proposed an amendment to FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1) that became
effective on December 1, 1990. The amendment provides that prior felony convictions of witnesses
other than a criminal defendant are admissible unless their probative value is substantially out-
weighed by their prejudicial effect. The amendment places stricter limitations on the use of a crimi-
nal defendant's prior felonies: they may be introduced only if their probative value outweighs their
prejudicial effect to the defendant. Although continuing to distinguish criminal defendants from all
other witnesses, the Advisory Committee rejected Bock Laundry's conclusion that prior convictions
prejudicial to litigants other than criminal defendants are automatically admissible.
Nevertheless, even the revisions to Rule 609 may not be as solicitous of the concerns of the
parties and the witnesses as a feminist approach would advocate. First, the standard to be applied to
prior felonies committed by witnesses other than criminal defendants strongly favors their admis-
sion. Cf. 2 D. LouISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 66, § 125, at 18-19 (discussing identical stan-
dard in FED. R. EvID. 403). Second, in evaluating prejudice, the courts presumably will consider
primarily the effect evidence of prior felonies will have on the outcome of the case, rather than the
witness's interests in avoiding embarrassment and publicity. Although the Advisory Committee
Note to the amended rule mentions the concerns of the witness at one point, its focus is on protecting
the litigants. See AMENDED FED. R. EvID. 609(a) advisory committee's note (noting that prior
convictions of prosecution witnesses ordinarily will be admissible because "there is little chance that
the trier of fact will misuse the convictions offered as impeachment evidence as propensity evidence,"
but that the criminal record of defense witnesses may be excluded because a defendant is "likely to
suffer some spill-over effect" from impeachment of her witnesses); see also Bock Laundry, 109 S. Ct.
at 1990; id. at 1996 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); cf supra note 134 (discussing trial judge's authority
to exclude prior felonies to protect the witness).
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The character evidence issues of most direct concern to women sur-
round the rape shield laws enacted in most jurisdictions during the
1970s.' 3 Although the specific contours of the statutes vary greatly
among the states,' 36 their primary purpose is to limit the circumstances
in which the defendant may introduce evidence of a rape victim's prior
sexual conduct. Before the enactment of shield laws, such evidence was
deemed relevant to prove that the victim was the type of person who
might have consented to intercourse with the defendant: because she
consented with another man, she must have consented with this one.' 31
The evidence also cast doubt on her credibility as a witness: a woman
who is not a virgin is also not a truthful person (although evidence of
prior sexual history was not necessarily admitted in other types of cases
where women provided crucial testimony).'13  As John Henry Wigmore
put it,
[t]he unchaste.., mentality finds incidental but direct expression in
the narration of imaginary sex incidents of which the narrator is the
heroine or the victim. On the surface the narration is straightfor-
ward and convincing. The real victim, however, too often in such
cases is the innocent man; for the respect and sympathy naturally
felt by any tribunal for a wronged female helps to give easy credit to
such a plausible tale.' 39
These doubts about the credibility of rape victims led to the adop-
tion of other special evidentiary rules in rape cases. Until recently, the
uncorroborated testimony of the victim was an insufficient basis for a
rape conviction in many states.""' Although a woman's unsubstantiated
testimony could support an assault or theft conviction, it could not sup-
port a rape conviction. Moreover, until the 1970s, most states required
the trial judge to instruct the jury to view the victim's testimony with
caution because rape charges are easily brought and not so easily dis-
proved; this instruction was not given in other criminal trials where the
victim of the crime testified for the prosecution but is still used in rape
cases in many jurisdictions. 4 ' Finally, Wigmore suggested that a trial
135. See Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Court" A Proposal for the
Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 765 n.3 (1986) (shield rules have been enacted by Congress
and 48 state legislatures and have been imposed by courts in one other state).
136. See id. at 773-76, 906-16; Tanford & Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth
Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 544, 551-53, 593-602 (1980).
137. See Berger, supra note 88, at 15-16; Borgida & White, Social Perception of Rape Victims:
The Impact of Legal Reform, 2 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 339, 340 (1978); Tanford & Bocchino, supra
note 136, at 546.
138. See Berger, supra note 88, at 16; Borgida & White, supra note 137, at 340; Tanford &
Bocchino, supra note 136, at 546, 549.
139. 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 924a, at 736 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970).
140. See Note, Defining the Boundaries, supra note 107, at 696 & n.36. See generally Note, The
Rape Corroboration Requirement- Repeal Not Reform, 81 YALE L.J. 1365 (1972) [hereinafter Note,
Rape Corroboration]. For an example of a rape statute requiring independent corroborative evi-
dence, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(5) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980).
141. See Note, The Case Against the Cautionary Instruction, supra note 88, at 155-56. For an
example of a rape statute requiring such an instruction, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(5) (Official
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judge should never permit a rape case to go to the jury "unless the female
complainant's social history and mental makeup ha[d] been examined
and testified to by a qualified physician."1 42
Recent efforts to reform rape laws have led to the abolition of the
corroboration requirement in most states, 1 43 along with the enactment of
rape shield laws. Nonetheless, some shield laws do not impose greater
substantive restrictions on the admission of sexual history evidence than
on any other evidence, permitting introduction of a victim's sexual his-
tory so long as the judge concludes that the testimony is relevant. 44
Even stricter shield laws like that which Congress added to the Federal
Rules in 1978 place no limit on evidence of "past sexual behavior with
the accused" when offered to prove consent. '45
Given the low reporting rates for rape" and the high incidence of
acquaintance rape, 47 a feminist theory of evidence would insist that
shield laws be written so as to respect a woman's sexual autonomy, en-
courage her to report rape charges, and minimize the trial's traumatic
effect on her. 148 The feminist approach therefore would reject the cava-
lier assumption that the victim's consent on some prior occasion is pro-
bative of her consent in this case. Respecting a woman's autonomy
requires that she be given the same right to choose her sexual partners
that a man would enjoy: she should not be a target for rapists simply
because she had prior sexual relationships. Likewise, the defendant's
knowledge of the victim's sexual history does not suggest that his mis-
taken perception of consent was reasonable. 49 He was not acting rea-
Draft and Revised Comments 1980). A number of recent decisions have concluded, however, that
the instruction is unnecessary. See Note, Defining the Boundaries, supra note 107, at 696 & n.37.
142. 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 139, § 924a, at 737 (emphasis deleted).
143. See Note, Defining the Boundaries, supra note 107, at 696 & n.36.
144. See Galvin, supra note 135, at 774 (some shield laws merely specify procedural require-
ments-typically, an evidentiary hearing-for the admission of sexual history evidence); Tanford &
Bocchino, supra note 136, at 593-94 (same). But cf. Galvin, supra note 135, at 879-83 (suggesting
that even in these states courts regularly exclude sexual history evidence).
145. FED. R. EvID. 412(b)(2)(B); see also Galvin, supra note 135, at 908-16 (almost all state
shield laws permit such use of sexual history evidence).
146. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 88, at 5; Robin, supra note 109, at 137; Note, A Matter of
Time, supra note 107, at 1101-02; Note, The Case Against the Cautionary Instruction, supra note 88,
at 157-58.
147. See, e.g., C. MACKINNON, supra note 28, at 247 (the rapist and the victim are strangers in
55% of rapes and attempted rapes reported to police, but in only 17% of all rapes and attempted
rapes); Estrich, supra note 88, at 1164-65 (survey of 930 women found that 56% of them had been
raped, 82% of those by nonstrangers; separate surveys of college students found that approximately
20% had been victims of date rape).
148. See Borgida & White, supra note 137, at 339-40 (primary explanation for rape victims'
reluctance to press charges was their "desire to avoid the ordeal of courtroom testimony," which
"often precipitates as much of a psychological crisis as the rape itself"); id. at 348-49 (stricter shield
laws tend to improve jury's perception of victim's credibility, decrease likelihood that jury will find
consent, and increase chances of conviction); see also supra note 109 and accompanying text.
149. But cf Doe v. United States, 666 F.2d 43, 48 (4th Cir. 1981) (concluding that defendant's
knowledge of victim's past sexual behavior was relevant to consent and admissible despite the exclu-
sionary provisions in FED. R. EvID. 412). See generally J. DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL
LAw 526-27 (1987) (in most jurisdictions, defendant's mistake about woman's consent must be rea-
sonable to afford defense to rape).
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sonably if he assumed that the woman's consent under other
circumstances indicated her willingness to have a sexual relationship
with him.'5 °
Even evidence of the victim's prior sexual relationship with the ac-
cused should not invariably be permitted. Most courts automatically ad-
mit such evidence without evaluating the circumstances surrounding the
prior sexual involvement or the nature of the subsequent relationship be-
tween the victim and the defendant.' l A prior relationship with the de-
fendant may help demonstrate his reasonable perception of consent in a
case where the sexual contact was close in time to the alleged rape and
there was no evidence of violence directed against the woman or of sig-
nificant intervening changes in their relationship. On the other hand,
admitting evidence of sexual contact that occurred in the distant past or
prior to the termination of a relationship between the two creates the
same presumption of permanent consent that has been soundly criticized
in marital rape cases. 1
5 2
Evidentiary issues akin to those arising in rape cases have also begun
to surface in cases involving charges of sexual harassment.15 3 Defend-
150. The feminist approach serves the additional purpose of minimizing the risk that common
myths about rape victims, see supra note 88; infra notes 173 & 185 and accompanying text, will lead
jurors who hear evidence of the victim's sexual history to assume that her prior sexual experience
does indicate that she consented, or at least that the defendant reasonably thought that she had.
151. See Galvin, supra note 135, at 816; see also Berger, supra note 88, at 58-59 (arguing that
excluding evidence of prior sexual relationship with the accused violates confrontation clause); Gal-
vin, supra note 135, at 807 (same).
The Supreme Court recently agreed to consider whether a rape defendant's constitutional rights
were violated when the trial court excluded evidence of his prior sexual contact with the victim
because he failed to comply with the state shield law's notice requirement. See Michigan v. Lucas,
433 Mich. 878, 446 N.W.2d 291 (1989), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 507 (1990) (No. 90-149).
152. See, e.g., People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152, 162-67, 474 N.E.2d 567, 572-75, 485 N.Y.S.2d
207, 212-15 (1984); West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the Promise of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 42 U. FLA. L. REV. 45, 63-71 (1990); Note, To Have and to Hold: The Marital Rape Exemp-
tion and the Fourteenth Amendment, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1255 (1986).
Limiting the admissibility of a rape victim's sexual history is not inconsistent with the feminist
ideal of contextual reasoning. Expanding the frame of reference to consider the context of a particu-
lar case does not necessarily make all evidence admissible. See supra note 110.
Likewise, a contextual approach does not mandate that evidence of the woman's sexual history
be admitted even though it would permit evidence of the defendant's prior violence against her. See
supra note 112 and accompanying text. In context-that is, taking into account the nature of sexual
relationships between women and men and the need to protect women's sexual autonomy-a woman
who has experienced violence in the past can reasonably be expected to submit to intercourse for fear
of further harm. Protecting the woman's autonomy requires that sexual conduct under those cir-
cumstances be deemed nonconsensual. On the other hand, focusing on that same context leads to
the conclusion that a man cannot reasonably assume that a woman is interested in a sexual relation-
ship with him based on her sexual history.
153. Sexual harassment is defined as "[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors,
and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature" if "(1) submission to such conduct is made
either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or
rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting
such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environ-
ment." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1990).
To date, only California has enacted a shield law for sexual harassment cases. See Comment,
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ants in such cases have sought to present evidence of the plaintiff's sexual
history, dress, and behavior in the office. 54 At the same time, plaintiffs
have attempted to introduce testimony concerning the defendant's char-
acter-specifically, evidence that he had subjected other women to simi-
lar harassing behavior.' 55
Judges should not admit testimony of a woman's sexual history any
more readily in sexual harassment cases than in rape trials. The plain-
tiff's prior sexual relationships with others do not suggest that she solic-
ited the unwanted attention, and do not justify the defendant's
assumption to the contrary.15 6 On the other hand, evidence of the de-
fendant's prior harassment of other women should be admitted in some
instances. The evidence may help establish that the defendant created a
hostile work environment or that an adverse employment decision was
intended to punish the plaintiff for rejecting his advances.5 7
C Privileges
As a general matter, privilege rules 8 might be seen as furthering
feminist principles because they value the preservation of relationships
over the admission of relevant evidence. But the current utilitarian justi-
fication for the privilege rules-that they are needed to encourage com-
munication in the context of confidential relationships t5a-is more
consistent with male values. The utilitarian rationale suggests that privi-
leges were created to protect men, who are often reluctant to share their
personal thoughts and therefore may need the assurance of protection
that the privilege rules supply, rather than women, who are more likely
to decide to confide in others independent of the evidentiary safeguard."0
A feminist approach to evidence would instead be based on the hu-
manistic rationale for privileges-that certain relationships are entitled
to protection by their very private nature. Although the nonutilitarian,
Sexual Harassment Cases and the Law of Evidence: A Proposed Rule, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 219,
220 [hereinafter Comment, Sexual Harassment Cases].
154. See Krieger & Fox, Evidentiary Issues in Sexual Harassment Litigation, I BERKELEY WO-
MEN'S L.J. 115, 116-26 (1985); Comment, Sexual Harassment Cases, supra note 153, at 235-43.
155. See Krieger & Fox, supra note 154, at 128-39.
156. The same analysis applies to a relationship between the plaintiff and defendant in the dis-
tant past.
157. See Krieger & Fox, supra note 154, at 136-39; cf FED. R. EvID. 404(b) (permitting use of
character evidence to show intent).
158. The Federal Rules do not expressly create any evidentiary privileges but instead rely on
"the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in
the light of reason and experience." FED. R. EvID. 501.
159. See MCCORMICK, supra note 65, § 72, at 171.
160. See, e.g., Aries & Johnson, Close Friendship in Adulthood: Conversational Content Between
Same-Sex Friends, 9 SEX ROLES 1183 (1983); Caldwell & Peplau, Sex Differences in Same-Sex
Friendship, 8 SEX ROLES 721 (1982); Fischer & Narus, Sex Roles and Intimacy in Same Sex and
Other Sex Relationships, 5 PSYCHOLOGY WOMEN Q. 444, 452-53 (1981); Fox, Gibbs & Auerbach,
Age and Gender Dimensions of Friendship, 9 PSYCHOLOGY WOMEN Q. 489 (1985); Williams, Gen-
der, Masculinity-Femininity, and Emotional Intimacy in Same-Sex Friendship, 12 SEX ROLES 587
(1985).
[Vol. 1991
EVIDENCE ENGENDERED
humanistic justification for the privilege rules has not received extensive
recognition in the courts,161 the feminist perspective would build on this
theory with an eye towards extending protection to those relationships
valued by women.
The feminist critique would also question the hierarchical configura-
tion of the modern privilege doctrine. The privilege rules tend to shelter
relationships accorded a high status by traditional, male norms, even
though the policy considerations used to justify those privileges support
extending protection to analogous relationships. For example, the mari-
tal privilege is limited to legally recognized marriages t62 and therefore
does not apply to people who are living together or who are involved in
homosexual relationships-that is, people whose lifestyles do not con-
form to traditional norms. 163 Moreover, the privilege does not protect
confidential conversations between family members'" 4 or best friends,
even though women may consider those relationships as confidential and
intimate as the marital relationship.' 65
The current status of professional privileges is similarly hierarchical.
All states recognize the attorney-client privilege, and most protect com-
munications to doctors and members of the clergy.' 66 But only about
one-third of the states extend the attorney-client privilege to accountants,
and only a handful of jurisdictions have applied the doctor-patient privi-
lege to protect communications to social workers, rape counselors, teach-
ers, school counselors, marriage counselors, or nurses.' 67  Thus, the
professional privileges protect those occupations that historically have
161. The utilitarian rationale, associated with Wigmore, currently appears to be the primary
justification for the privilege rules, see McCORMICK, supra note 65, § 72, at 171-72, although some
commentators have espoused the humanistic rationale, see, e.g., A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREE-
DoM 31-39 (1967); Black, The Marital and Physician Privileges-A Reprint of a Letter to a Congress-
man, 1975 DUKE L.J. 45, 49-50; Krattenmaker, Testimonial Privileges in Federal Courts: An
Alternative to the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEO. L.J. 61, 85-94 (1973).
162. See MCCORMICK, supra note 65, § 81, at 195.
163. In fact, the origins of the marital privilege can be traced to discriminatory attitudes about
women: the privilege has its roots in the common-law rule that disqualified a party's spouse from
testifying because a wife had no identity independent of her husband. See 2 D. LOUISELL & C.
MUELLER, supra note 66, § 217, at 866-67; see also supra note 124 and accompanying text. Even
today, the privilege seems to be more protective of men because most marital privilege cases involve
men seeking to prevent their wives from testifying against them. See Lempert, A Right to Every
Woman's Evidence, 66 IOWA L. REV. 725, 727 (1981).
164. See, e.g., Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 390 Mass. 357, 362-63, 455 N.E.2d 1203,
1207 (1983) (citing cases), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984); Note, Parent-Child Loyalty and Testi-
monial Privilege, 100 HARV. L. REV. 910, 911-15 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Parent-Child Loyalty].
165. See, e.g., Buhrke & Fuqua, Sex Differences in Same- and Cross-Sex Supportive Relation-
ships, 17 SEx ROLES 339 (1987); Fischer & Narus, supra note 160, at 454; Hacker, Blabbermouths
and Clams: Sex Differences in Self-Disclosure in Same-Sex and Cross-Sex Friendship Dyads, 5 PsY-
CHOLOGY WOMEN Q. 385, 396-99 (1981); Rose, Same- and Cross-Sex Friendships and the Psychology
of Homosociality, 12 SEx ROLES 63 (1985); Safilios-Rothschild, Toward a Social Psychology of Rela-
tionships, 5 PSYCHOLOGY WOMEN Q. 377, 380 (1981); Note, Parent-Child Loyalty, supra note 164,
at 915-25.
166. See MCCORMICK, supra note 65, § 76.2, at 183-84.
167. See id. at 185; see also Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973) (rejecting account-
ant-client privilege); Report of the New York Task Force on Women in the Courts, supra note 22, at
61-63 (discussing rape counselor privilege).
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been male-dominated and exclude equivalent lower-status jobs that tradi-
tionally have been more accessible to women. Likewise, the privileges
tend to provide greater protection to individuals of higher socioeconomic
status-those, for example, who can afford to consult a psychiatrist
rather than a social worker or marriage counselor.
By contrast, a feminist view of privileges would not distinguish be-
tween conversations with doctors and conversations with rape counselors
because both relationships are equally private. In fact, even the utilita-
rian approach should support broadening the scope of the current privi-
leges: society has an interest in encouraging people to make full
disclosures to nurses and social workers as well as to doctors and psychi-
atrists. Some may object that creating additional privileges will deprive
the courts of too much relevant evidence. Although that criticism may
have some merit, those who are interested in facilitating the admission of
relevant evidence should re-examine the privilege rules with an eye to-
wards developing a more-balanced approach that eliminates the discrimi-
natory effects of the current structure.
A feminist approach to evidence would not necessarily extend the
privilege rules to every arguably confidential relationship. It would sup-
port, for example, the Supreme Court's recent decision to require disclo-
sure of confidential university peer review materials sought by a professor
who alleged that she had been denied tenure because of her race, sex, and
national origin. 6 ' The feminist's humanistic rationale for privileges
would not characterize the relationship between an employer and a job
performance evaluator as one of the private relationships especially de-
serving of protection.
D. Expert Testimony
The Federal Rules permit the introduction of expert testimony if it
will "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue" and the witness is "qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education."' 69 In making these determina-
tions, many courts follow the three-part test set out in Frye v. United
States: (1) the subject of the expert's testimony must be outside " 'the
range of common experience or common knowledge,' "and must instead
require " 'special experience or special knowledge' "; (2) the expert's
methodology must be "sufficiently established to have gained general ac-
ceptance in the particular field in which it belongs"; (3) and the witness
must be " 'skilled in that particular science, art, or trade to which the
question relates.' "1o Although the general trend has been to relax evi-
168. University of Pa. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 110 S. Ct. 577 (1990).
169. FED. R. EVID. 702.
170. 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (quoting Brief for Appellant). Although the drafters of
the Federal Rules did not indicate whether they intended to retain the Frye test or to adopt a more
flexible approach, see Mengler, supra note 41, at 447-49, many federal courts continue to follow
Frye. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 348, 353 (7th Cir. 1989); Novak v. United States,
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dentiary requirements for such testimony, 7 ' gender bias has resulted in
the exclusion of expert testimony on issues directly affecting women.'
7 2
For example, prosecutors in rape cases have attempted to introduce
expert psychological testimony on the rape trauma syndrome to explain
what may appear to be unusual behavior on the part of the victim-her
failure to report the crime promptly, her inability to identify her at-
tacker, her loss of memory about events prior to the incident, and her
apparent calmness after the rape.' 7 3  In addition, prosecutors have
sought to present such testimony to suggest that a woman who exper-
ienced symptoms of rape trauma syndrome did not consent to
intercourse. '
74
Although courts regularly admit rape trauma syndrome testimony
when offered to explain the victim's unusual behavior,77 they have been
more reluctant to permit prosecutors to use the evidence to suggest that
the victim was in fact raped. A number of courts have excluded such
evidence on the grounds that the jury is perfectly capable of determining
whether or not the woman consented and thus whether or not the de-
fendant is guilty of rape. These courts have concluded that the subject of
the expert's testimony is not "beyond the ken" of the jury, thus failing
the first prong of the Frye test, or would not be "helpful" to the jury
within the terms of the Federal Rules.
176
Courts have used similar reasoning to exclude expert psychological
testimony on the battered woman syndrome. Battered women who killed
their husbands in nonconfrontational circumstances have attempted to
introduce expert testimony to explain why they reasonably feared for
their lives when, for example, they struck back while their husbands were
asleep, and why they did not leave the abusive relationship instead of
resorting to self-defense. 177  Although most courts have now concluded
that this testimony falls outside the jury's common experience,178 some
have excluded it on the theory that the jury can resolve the woman's self-
865 F.2d 718, 722-23 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. Gillespie, 852 F.2d 475, 481-82 (9th Cir.
1988); United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 59-61 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 817 (1987).
See generally Note, The Frye Doctrine and Relevancy Approach Controversy: An Empirical Evalua-
tion, 74 GEO. L.J. 1769 (1986). In addition, many state courts have adopted the Frye test. See
Massaro, supra note 88, at 433-34 & n.173.
171. See Massaro, supra note 88, at 439.
172. See generally Gianelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States
a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1221 (1980) ("Instead of using [the Frye standard]
as an analytical tool to decide whether novel scientific evidence should be admitted, it appears that
many courts apply it as a label to justify their own views about the reliability of particular forensic
techniques.").
173. See Note, Defining the Boundaries, supra note 107, at 713-17.
174. See id. at 717-24.
175. See id. at 713-14.
176. See Massaro, supra note 88, at 438; Note, Defining the Boundaries, supra note 107, at 726-
27.
177. See Kinports, supra note 26, at 396-407.
178. See, e.g., Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801, 805-06 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (per curiam),
petition denied, 415 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1982); State v. Hodges, 239 Kan. 63, 67-69, 716 P.2d 563, 566-
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defense claim without the assistance of expert testimony-fear is a com-
monly understood emotion that the jury is capable of evaluating. 7 9
A final example arises in tort cases where plaintiffs seek to introduce
expert testimony on the proper valuation of homemaking or caretaking
services. The evidence is offered to assist the jury in awarding damages
either to injured women no longer able to provide such services or to
plaintiffs who receive care at home from other (typically female) mem-
bers of their family. Again, some courts have admitted this testimony,
but others have decided that such matters are within the jury's common
experience and therefore not proper subjects of expert testimony." 0
The decision to exclude expert testimony in these cases reflects an
assumption that issues of importance to women are simple, "common"
matters that everyone understands, rather than "technical," male issues
that might require expert testimony. By contrast, courts have readily
admitted expert testimony on subjects much less complicated than the
psychological effects of rape or spouse abuse. For example, courts have
not hesitated to permit experts to testify that the defendant was driving
so as to avoid being followed; 8' that the impression of a shoe print left at
the scene of the crime matched a sample print taken from the defendant's
shoe; 8 2 that an accident was caused by the plaintiff's failure to drive in
his own lane, which "may" have been the result of the plaintiff's unfa-
miliarity with the car;183 and that more than $12,000 in cash found in a
bag on the front seat of the defendant's car was to be used to purchase
narcotics. 8 4
The obvious discrepancies in the case law not only devalue the con-
cerns and experience of women as common and simplistic but also per-
petuate myths that stereotype and subordinate women. Absent expert
67 (1986); State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 209, 478 A.2d 364, 379 (1984); People v. Torres, 128 Misc. 2d
129, 134-35, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358, 362-63 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
I acted as cocounsel representing the American Psychological Association in Kelly and on the
subsequent appeal in Hawthorne, 470 So. 2d 770 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). The Association filed an
amicus brief in both cases, supporting the admission of expert testimony on the battered woman
syndrome in cases where women are charged with killing abusive husbands.
179. See Mullis v. State, 248 Ga. 338, 339, 282 S.E.2d 334, 337 (1981); People v. Powell, 102
Misc. 2d 775, 781, 424 N.Y.S.2d 626, 631 (Tompkins County Ct. 1980), aff'd, 83 A.D.2d 719, 442
N.Y.S.2d 645 (1981); State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 521, 423 N.E.2d 137, 139-40 (1981). The
Ohio Supreme Court recently overruled Thomas and permitted the introduction of battered woman
syndrome evidence. See State v. Koss, 49 Ohio St. 3d 213, 551 N.E.2d 970 (1990).
180. See Finley, supra note 32, at 51-54; see also EI-Meswari v. Washington Gas Light Co., 785
F.2d 483, 487 (4th Cir. 1986) (mother's physical and emotional injury resulting from daughter's
death was matter that jury could evaluate without expert testimony).
181. See United States v. Andersson, 813 F.2d 1450, 1458-59 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Stewart, 770 F.2d 825, 831 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1103 (1986).
182. See United States v. Rose, 731 F.2d 1337, 1345-46 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 931
(1984).
183. See Gladhill v. General Motors Corp., 743 F.2d 1049, 1052 (4th Cir, 1984).
184. See United States v. Mang Sun Wong, 884 F.2d 1537, 1543-44 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 1140 (1990); see also United States v. Carson, 702 F.2d 351, 369 (2d Cir.) (admitting
expert testimony that defendant's furtive conduct appeared to involve the sale of narcotics), cert.
denied, 462 U.S. 1108 (1983).
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guidance on the rape trauma syndrome, for example, the jury in a rape
case may well believe that a failure to report the rape promptly and a
lack of emotion after the assault suggest that the charges are unfounded,
or that acquaintance rape or rape unaccompanied by serious bodily harm
is not "real" rape. 8 ' In battered women's self-defense cases, the unedu-
cated jury may assume that if the woman was truly abused, she would
have left the relationship, and may expect her to conform to male stan-
dards of behavior in resisting attacks by her husband. 86 In the tort con-
text, the jury is left to assume that the proper measure of damages is the
minimum wage paid in the market for housekeeping tasks or, even worse,
that "what is provided without financial reward may be considered of
little or no financial value in the marketplace."' 87 Unless expert testi-
mony is admitted on these issues of concern to women, legal norms re-
flecting a male perspective will be applied to women in circumstances
where they are not appropriate.
Expert testimony on questions of importance to women has also
been excluded on the ground that it was not sufficiently reliable, or, in
the language of the Frye test, had not been generally accepted in the
relevant scientific community. For example, some courts have rejected
testimony on the battered woman syndrome because "acceptance or rec-
ognition of the phenomenon is largely limited to the people who are ac-
tively engaged in the research,"' 88 and the testimony therefore has not
received "a showing of substantial support from the appropriate field of
science." 189 To these courts, consensus among those most familiar with
the psychological impact of long-term abuse is not enough; some other
group of experts (perhaps those who are more credible because they are
men or because their work does not focus on women?) must also endorse
the research.
In questioning the reliability of expert testimony about the battered
woman syndrome, some judges have cited language appearing in the in-
troduction to Lenore Walker's comprehensive study of battered women:
I think this research has raised more questions for me than it
has answered. As a trained researcher, I felt uneasy about stating
some of my conclusions in this book. They seemed too tentative to
write down in the positive manner which I have used. Yet they are
185. See, e.g., ILLINOIS TASK FORCE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS, supra note 22, at 110;
Massaro, supra note 88, at 402-10, 429-30, 442-43; Note, Defining the Boundaries, supra note 107, at
726-31; see also supra note 88.
186. See, e.g., Mather, The Skeleton in the Closet: The Battered Woman Syndrome, Self-De-
fense, and Expert Testimony, 39 MERCER L. REV. 545, 576-81 (1988); Schneider, Describing and
Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9
WOMENS' RTS. L. REP. 195, 201-02 (1986); see also supra note 89.
187. DeLong v. County of Erie, 60 N.Y.2d 296, 307-08, 457 N.E.2d 717, 722-23, 469 N.Y.S.2d
611, 617-18 (1983).
188. Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Wyo. 1981).
189. Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 455 A.2d 893, 895 (D.C. App. 1983) (Gallagher, J., concur-
ring); see also Hawthorne v. State, 470 So. 2d 770, 773-74 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); State v.
Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 521-22, 423 N.E.2d 137, 139-40 (1981).
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confirmed repeatedly by all the available data so far."9°
Seizing on Walker's admission of uncertainty and completely ignoring
the final sentence, some judges would refuse to permit expert testimony
describing the battered woman syndrome because the research is "in its
infancy."'19'
Although many courts have reached the contrary conclusion, 92
none have recognized the gender bias implicit in relying on Walker's in-
troduction to exclude the testimony. Women tend to speak in more qual-
ifying, hesitant language, whereas men are more likely to speak with
assurance even when they are not in fact so certain of their position.' 93
Thus, Walker's introduction says little about the unreliability of her the-
ory--especially when considered in the context of the entire statement.
In challenging the validity of expert testimony on the battered wo-
man syndrome, judges have also relied on the portion of Walker's intro-
duction in which she acknowledges that the book is written "from a
feminist vision": "I view women as victims in order to understand what
the toll of such domestic violence is like for them. Unfortunately, in
doing so I tend to place all men in an especially negative light .. ,,. 4
One judge characterized this statement as "a trifle disconcerting."'' 95 In
refusing to permit Walker to testify in another case, the court charged
that "Dr. Walker may make certain conclusions and state certain theo-
ries, then engage in research to attempt to substantiate those theories and
conclusions."196
These criticisms are based on the naive assumption that experts ap-
proach their research from a position of complete neutrality and that
science is not subject to manipulation. 97 Moreover, the suggestion that
Walker may be too biased to testify as an expert witness ignores the
many cases in which courts have readily admitted expert testimony in
fields that historically have held negative attitudes towards women. The
medical profession, for example, is not immune from the gender bias
prevalent in our society. A physician's reaction to a patient's symptoms
may well depend on the patient's gender, with women's complaints taken
less seriously and dismissed more often as psychosomatic. 9 Similarly,
190. L. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN xv-xvi (1979).
191. Ibn-Tamas, 455 A.2d at 894-95 (Gallagher, J., concurring); Buhrle, 627 P.2d at 1376-77.
Other courts have used this rationale to bar expert testimony concerning the rape trauma syndrome.
See generally Massaro, supra note 88, at 447-52.
192. See State v. Hodges, 239 Kan. 63, 69-71, 716 P.2d 563, 567-69 (1986); State v. Kelly, 97
N.J. 178, 209-11, 478 A.2d 364, 379-80 (1984); People v. Torres, 128 Misc. 2d 129, 135, 488
N.Y.S.2d 358, 363 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
193. See, e.g., C. GILLIGAN, supra note 27, at 16; Schafran, supra note 22, at 16; Weiss &
Melling, The Legal Education of Twenty Women, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1299, 1332-45 (1988).
194. L. WALKER, supra note 190, at xvii.
195. Ibn-Tamas, 455 A.2d at 894 (Gallagher, J., concurring).
196. Buhrle, 627 P.2d at 1377.
197. See generally T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970).
198. See, e.g., Armitage, Schneiderman & Bass, Response of Physicians to Medical Complaints in
Men and Women, 241 J. A.M.A. 2186 (1979); Fidell, Sex Role Stereotypes and the American Physi-
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Freudian psychiatrists may believe that women fantasize about rape and
incest, 99 and the mental health community in general has a long history
of viewing women as hysterical, neurotic, and unstable,2 °° as well as re-
sponsible for any psychological problems their children might develop.20'
Yet one does not find judges refusing to admit expert testimony in these
fields because they find gender bias that devalues women
"disconcerting."
The reservations about the reliability and neutrality of Walker's re-
search are especially ironic in light of the courts' willingness to permit
psychiatrists to testify at a capital sentencing hearing concerning the like-
lihood that the defendant will pose a future danger to society.20 2 Such
evidence is routinely admitted, even though the American Psychiatric
Association believes that two-thirds of the predictions are inaccurate and
that psychiatrists lack the expertise to make reliable estimates of long-
term future dangerousness. 20 3 Moreover, the so-called experts are al-
lowed to testify despite evidence that they are not neutral but instead
routinely err on the side of overpredicting dangerousness. 2° Dr. James
Grigson, for example, whose testimony in innumerable death penalty
hearings has earned him the nickname "Doctor Death," apparently bases
his predictions of future dangerousness on a ninety-minute interview and
"has yet to meet a defendant whom he does not think dangerous. 215
A feminist theory of evidence would question not only the courts'
reluctance to admit expert testimony on issues of concern to women, but
also gender differences in the treatment of expert witnesses. The percep-
tion that women are less capable and authoritative than men tends to
undermine the credibility of women who testify as experts, especially
those who work in traditionally male-dominated fields.206 In addition, as
cian, 4 PSYCHOLOGY WOMEN Q. 313 (1980); see also Wolinsky, The Bias Against Women in Medical
Research, AM. C. PHYSICIANS OBSERVER, Apr. 1989, at 15 (describing gender bias and exclusion of
women in medical studies and research).
199. See J. MASSON, THE ASSAULT ON TRUTH: FREUD'S SUPPRESSION OF THE SEDUCTION
THEORY 189-93 (1985); Massaro, supra note 88, at 418-19; Note, Rape Corroboration, supra note
140, at 1376-77.
200. See, e.g., P. CHESLER, WOMEN AND MADNESS (1972); Brown & Hellinger, Therapists'
Attitudes Toward Women, 20 Soc. WORK 266 (1975); Caplan, The Name Game: Psychiatry, Misog-
yny and Taxonomy, in WOMEN, POWER AND THERAPY: ISSUES FOR WOMEN 187 (M. Braude ed.
1988); Chesler, Women as Psychiatric and Psychotherapeutic Patients, 33 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 746
(1971); Dailey, Are Social Workers Sexists? A Replication, 25 Soc. WORK 46 (1980); Murray, Sex
Bias in Psychotherapy: A Historical Perspective, in BIAS IN PSYCHOTHERAPY 3 (1983).
201. See Caplan & Hall-McCorquodale, Mother-Blaming in Major Clinical Journals, 55 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 345 (1985).
202. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 896-904 (1983).
203. See id. at 920-22 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
204. See id. at 922 & n.4.
205. Merton, Confidentiality and the "Dangerous" Patient: Implications of Tarasofffor Psychia-
trists and Lawyers, 31 EMORY L.J. 262, 287 (1982); see also Dix, The Death Penalty, "Dangerous-
ness," Psychiatric Testimony, and Professional Ethics, 5 Am. J. CRIM. L. 151, 172 (1977) (charging
that Grigson "operate[s] at the brink of quackery" because of his "strongly held view of the propri-
ety of the death penalty"). Grigson was one of two psychiatrists who testified for the prosecution at
Barefoot's sentencing hearing. See Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 884.
206. See Report of the New York Task Force on Women in the Courts, supra note 22, at 118
No. 2]
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
suggested above, women may receive less deference because of their ten-
dency to qualify their statements and admit uncertainty about their re-
sults. Gender bias will have an even greater effect on the expert's
credibility if the judge permits irrelevant cross-examination questions
about her personal life that no attorney would consider asking a male
witness.2"7
E. The Confrontation Clause
A feminist theory of evidence would find much to criticize in the
most recent Supreme Court decisions interpreting the reach of the con-
frontation clause, which ensures criminal defendants the right "to be
confronted with the witnesses against [them]."20 8 The Court has been
willing to sacrifice the confrontation rights of defendants facing drug
conspiracy charges but has given prosecutors much less latitude in child
abuse cases. The Court has thereby authorized exceptions to the con-
frontation guarantee in an uneven fashion-and in a way that suggests
insensitivity to issues of importance to women. The disparity may be due
to a belief that drug conspirators are more dangerous to society than
child abusers, or to a judgment that out-of-court statements made by
coconspirators are more reliable than out-of-court assertions by child
abuse victims. In either case, the contrast between the cases reflects a
male view of the world that is inconsistent with feminist concerns.
The Court has typically permitted the use of hearsay evidence in a
criminal case so long as the prosecution demonstrated both that the de-
clarant was unavailable to testify at trial and that the out-of-court state-
ment either fell within a long-established hearsay exception or otherwise
had "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. ' 20 9 In United States
v. Inadi, however, the Court allowed the prosecution to introduce a
coconspirator's out-of-court statements without proof that the cocon-
spirator was unavailable to testify. 2 '0 The Court reasoned that cocon-
spirator statements are "usually irreplaceable as substantive evidence"
and therefore have probative value regardless of the declarant's availabil-
ity at the time of trial: "[c]onspirators are likely to speak differently
when talking to each other in furtherance of their illegal aims than when
(judges give less credence to female experts); Schafran, supra note 22, at 15-17 (judges comment on
dress and personal appearance of female experts and address them by first names and inappropriate
terms of endearment); Schaller, The Advancement of Women in Academic Medicine, 264 J. A.M.A.
1854, 1854-55 (1990); Sherman, Women as Expert Witnesses: Trials and Tribulations, 19 TRIAL,
Aug. 1983, at 46, 47. See generally Etaugh & Kasley, Evaluating Competence: Effects of Sex, Mari-
tal Status, and Parental Status, 6 PSYCHOLOGY WOMEN Q. 196 (1981) (women are generally per-
ceived as less competent than men); Lott, The Devaluation of Women's Competence, 41 J. Soc.
IssuEs 43 (1985) (competent women's work product is evaluated more critically, and their success is
attributed to luck rather than ability).
207. See Sherman, supra note 206, at 47 (expert's family, children, and socioeconomic status
were subjects of cross-examination questions).
208. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
209. Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3146 (1990); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
210. 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
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testifying on the witness stand. 21 1
The following Term, in Bourjaily v. United States, the Court modi-
fied the traditional hearsay exception for coconspirator statements.21 2
Previously, the prosecutor had been required to introduce evidence in-
dependent of the coconspirator's statement in satisfying the prerequisites
for admission-in particular, the requirement of evidence establishing
the existence of a conspiracy involving both the coconspirator-declarant
and the defendant.21 3 Instead, Bourjaily held, the trial court may con-
sider the coconspirator's statement itself when determining whether that
preliminary showing has been made.2 4 The Court then concluded that
coconspirator statements have historically been excepted from the hear-
say rule and therefore need no particular indicia of reliability to satisfy
the dictates of the confrontation clause2 5 -even though the long-estab-
lished hearsay exception for coconspirator statements differed from the
new exception Bourjaily had approved.
In Idaho v. Wright, by contrast, the Court reversed a child abuse
conviction on confrontation clause grounds where the trial court permit-
ted a pediatrician to testify that one of the victims had reported that she
and her sister had been abused by the defendant. 2 6  Explaining that
statements coming within a long-established hearsay exception "'possess
"the imprimatur of judicial and legislative experience,"' "217 the Court
concluded that statements admitted under a residual hearsay exception,
like those at issue in Wright, "almost by definition ... do not share the
same tradition of reliability that supports the admissibility of statements
under a firmly rooted hearsay exception."2 The confrontation clause
therefore required specific evidence of trustworthiness before the child's
hearsay statements could be admitted under the residual exception.
211. Id. at 395.
212. 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
213. See id. at 176-77 (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 701 (1974); Glasser v.
United States, 315 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1942)); see also FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) (also requiring that
statement be made "during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy").
214. See 483 U.S. at 176-8 1. The Court did not decide, however, whether a coconspirator's out-
of-court statement can by itself establish the existence of a conspiracy so as to satisfy the require-
ments for admission. See id. at 181.
215. See id. at 182-84.
216. 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990). The trial court refused to let the girl testify on the ground that she
was unable to communicate effectively to the jury, a ruling that the Supreme Court did not address.
See id. at 3147.
217. Id. (quoting Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 552 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting G.
LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 78, at 277-78 (1978))).
218. Id. at 3148. Idaho's residual hearsay exception, modeled after FED. R. EVID. 803(24),
allows the admission of
[a] statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is
offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which
it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable ef-
forts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served
by admission of the statement in question.
IDAHO RULE EVID. 803(24).
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Apparently the Court did not recognize-at least it did not ac-
knowledge-the seeming inconsistency between this analysis and
Bourjaily. Bourjaily had concluded that even a coconspirator hearsay
rule that looked quite different from the traditional rule nevertheless fell
within a long-established hearsay exception and therefore required no in-
dependent evidence of reliability to satisfy confrontation clause concerns.
The disparity between the two decisions is even more ironic given that
statements are not admitted under a residual hearsay exception absent
evidence of their reliability,2 19 whereas coconspirator hearsay is admissi-
ble on the theory that conspirators act as each other's agents, and not
because coconspirator statements are particularly reliable.22°
Wright also concluded that the victim's out-of-court statement ac-
cusing the defendant of sexually abusing her lacked sufficient indicia of
reliability to satisfy the confrontation clause. The Court ruled that the
only pertinent consideration in evaluating the reliability of a hearsay
statement is the statement's "inherent trustworthiness."22 ' Independent
evidence corroborating the assertion is irrelevant, according to the Court,
because it is "no substitute for cross-examination of the declarant at
trial" :222
[T]he use of corroborating evidence to support a hearsay statement's
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" would permit admis-
sion of a presumptively unreliable statement by bootstrapping on the
trustworthiness of other evidence at trial, a result we think at odds
with the requirement that hearsay evidence ... be so trustworthy
that cross-examination of the declarant would be of marginal
utility. 2
23
The Court acknowledged that the child's volunteered statement that the
defendant had also abused her sister "presented a closer question" be-
cause "the spontaneity of the statement and the change in demeanor"
indicated that the accusation was truthful.224 Nevertheless, the Court
concluded that that statement was inadmissible as well because it was not
as reliable as evidence admitted under the long-standing hearsay excep-
tions for excited utterances or statements made for purposes of medical
diagnosis.225
This part of the Court's analysis in Wright is also contrary to its
holdings in the drug conspiracy cases. The Court has such confidence in
the reliability of coconspirator statements that it permits the prosecutor
to introduce them without accounting for the absence of the declarant or
219. See supra note 218.
220. See United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. 292, 297-98, 12 Wheat. 460, 468-70 (1827); FED. R.
EvID. 801(d)(2)(E) advisory committee's note.
221. 110 S. Ct. at 3150.
222. Id. at 3152.
223. Id. at 3150.
224. Id. at 3152.
225. See id.; see also FED. R. EvID. 803(2) (hearsay exception for excited utterances); id. 803(4)
(hearsay exception for statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment).
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presenting any evidence of their reliability. As explained above, how-
ever, courts use notions of agency and not the inherent reliability of
coconspirator statements to justify the coconspirator hearsay excep-
tion.226 Thus, coconspirator hearsay is not necessarily as trustworthy as
excited utterances or statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis;
in fact, the Inadi dissent listed a number of reasons to doubt the general
reliability of coconspirator statements. 227 At the very least, the risks of
inaccuracy suggest that cross-examination of a coconspirator-declarant
would be of more than "marginal utility," 228 so that the government
should be permitted to deny the defendant that opportunity only when
the declarant is unavailable to testify.
In Maryland v. Craig, the companion case to Wright, the Court up-
held the use of a one-way closed-circuit television to present the testi-
mony of the victims in a child abuse case. 229 The Court reasoned that
the state's interest in protecting the children from the trauma of testify-
ing outweighed the defendant's right to have them testify in her presence
because the procedure preserved the other elements of the confrontation
guarantee: the children testified under oath, they were subject to cross-
examination, and the jury had an opportunity to see their demeanor.23°
Justice Scalia dissented, however, arguing that the defendant had
been denied her constitutional right to face her accusers. He distin-
guished cases like Inadi on the ground that there the defendant had no
right to insist on a face-to-face encounter with a government witness who
had not appeared at trial at all.231 In the dissent's view, therefore, Inadi's
rights were not violated by the admission of an out-of-court statement
made by a coconspirator who may well have been available to testify, but
Craig's rights were infringed by the introduction of live testimony, with
an opportunity to cross-examine, by means of closed-circuit television!
Although two of the four Craig dissenters-Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall-would have reversed the convictions in both drug conspiracy cases
as well as in the two child abuse cases, the other two-Justices Scalia and
Stevens-found the confrontation clause violated only in the two child
abuse cases and not in the drug conspiracy cases.
The Justices' differing interpretations of the confrontation clause in
these four cases may be attributable to myths about the relative credibil-
ity of child abuse victims and drug conspirators. In fact, Justice Scalia's
dissent in Craig expressly questioned the trustworthiness of child abuse
victims, observing that "children are substantially more vulnerable to
226. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
227. See 475 U.S. 387, 404-05 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (coconspirator's out-of-court
statement may be ambiguous, spoken in slang or private code, or intended to mislead listener con-
cerning strength or aims of conspiracy).
228. Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3150.
229. 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
230. See id. at 3166-70.
231. See id. at 3172-73 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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suggestion than adults, and often unable to separate recollected fantasy
(or suggestion) from reality." '232 Alternatively, the discrepancies among
the cases may reflect beliefs about the relative societal harm resulting
from the two crimes. These beliefs may be traceable to the legal system's
traditional reluctance to prosecute child abusers due to concerns about
preserving family privacy and the common-law notion that fathers
owned their children and therefore had every right to beat them.233
Feminist theory would question these rationales, both of which re-
semble arguments feminists have rejected when offered in analogous
cases involving women. Like children, women are perceived as less cred-
ible, especially when they are accusing men of abuse.234 Empirical evi-
dence indicates, however, that child abuse is widespread and that fears of
false charges are exaggerated. 235 Similarly, the traditional unwillingness
to prosecute child abusers parallels the reluctance to convict husbands
for assaulting their wives: domestic violence is considered a family prob-
lem rather than a matter of concern to the criminal justice system,236 and
historically women were treated as the property of their husbands and
therefore were legally subject to abuse. 237 A feminist approach to evi-
dence would challenge these views and would also consider efforts to pro-
tect children as deserving of priority as the war on drugs.
IV. A FEMINIST APPROACH TO TEACHING EVIDENCE
Adopting a feminist perspective in teaching evidence will affect both
the substance of the course and the teaching method. On the substantive
front, the evidence instructor can incorporate the issues analyzed above
in Parts II and III with an eye towards achieving several goals. She can
educate students about the biased nature of some evidence rules by dis-
cussing, for example, the special evidentiary rules applied in rape
cases. 1 3  She can illustrate the discriminatory impact of apparently neu-
tral evidence rules by asking why matching shoe prints and analyzing
driving behavior are complicated matters requiring expert testimony,
232. Id. at 3175.
233. See Saunders, supra note 93, at 40-41; cf Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of
Change. Law, Language, and Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1665, 1666-72 (1990) (criticizing
Supreme Court's assumption in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct.
998 (1989), that child abuse is private rather than public matter). See generally Olsen, supra note 37,
at 1504-13.
234. See supra notes 51-52, 88-89, 108-09 & 137-42 and accompanying text.
235. See, e.g., D. RUSSELL, SEXUAL EXPLOITATION: RAPE, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE, AND
WORKPLACE HARASSMENT 172-94 (1984); D. WHITCOMB, E. SHAPIRO & L. STELLWAGEN, WHEN
THE VICTIM IS A CHILD: ISSUES FOR JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS 1-5, 38 (1985); Saunders, supra
note 93, at 22-23; Saunders, Judicial Attitudes Toward Child Sexual Abuse: A Preliminary Examina-
tion, 70 JUDICATURE 95, 96-97 (1986); Thoennes, Child Sexual Abuse: Whom Should a Judge Be-
lieve? What Should a Judge Believe?, JUDGES' J., Summer 1988, at 14, 16-18.
236. See, e.g., ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 51, at
11-12; U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 51, at 21; Lerman, supra note 94, at 77-78.
237. See, e.g., Kinports, supra note 26, at 399 n.23.
238. See supra notes 135-42 and accompanying text.
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while properly valuing a woman's caretaking services is not.239 And she
can inform students about relevant aspects of women's legal history by
explaining the background of rape shield laws 2" and spousal privi-
leges,24' thereby placing the current doctrines in their historical gendered
context.
In addition, the instructor can incorporate issues of interest to wo-
men in teaching basic evidentiary principles. Cases where experts testi-
fied about the battered woman syndrome or the rape trauma syndrome
can be used to outline the rules governing expert testimony.242 The logic
of the current structure of evidentiary privileges can be explored by dis-
cussing why information disclosed to a psychiatrist is privileged, whereas
conversations with a rape counselor or social worker are not.243 Ques-
tions about the admissibility of the plaintiff's sexual history in a sexual
harassment case and of the defendant's prior harassment of other women
can be analyzed to explain the character evidence rules as well as the
concepts of prejudice and probative value. 24
Although some might object that the law school curriculum "should
not be expected to satisfy special interest groups, ' 241 this argument has
little force when the "special interest group" at issue comprises forty per-
cent of the class.246 Moreover, Mary Joe Frug has responded persua-
sively to this criticism: "confining issues that particularly concern
women to domestic relations or sex discrimination courses ... perpetu-
ate[s] the idea that women's interests are personal, concerning only
themselves or their families. Men, in contrast, are concerned with the
rest of life.", 247
In addition to affecting the substance of the course, a feminist ap-
proach to evidence will also have an impact on the teaching method. On
the most basic level, a feminist teaching method requires the use of gen-
der-neutral language in the classroom and the course materials,248 and
the inclusion of cases, problems, and hypotheticals that depict women
with admirable character traits playing diverse roles-that is, women
who do not merely conform to stereotypical notions of female traits and
occupations.249
239. See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 137-42 and accompanying text.
241. See supra note 163.
242. See supra notes 173-79 & 185-96 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 153-57 and accompanying text.
245. Frug, supra note 33, at 1091-92.
246. See Project, Gender, Legal Education, and the Legal Profession: An Empirical Study of
Stanford Law Students and Graduates, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1209, 1209 (1988).
247. Frug, supra note 33, at 1091-92.
248. See id. at 1094-97; Tobias, supra note 32, at 501-04; Weiss & Melling, supra note 193, at
1337. See generally D. BARON, GRAMMAR AND GENDER 6, 99-100, 175-76 (1986); Henley, This
New Species That Seeks a New Language: On Sexism in Language and Language Change, in Wo-
MEN AND LANGUAGE IN TRANSITION 3, 6-8 (Q. Penfield ed. 1987).
249. See Frug, supra note 33, at 1077-87; Tobias, supra note 32, at 497-501.
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A feminist teaching method also requires a retreat from the tradi-
tional focus on abstract legal rules and an emphasis instead on the fac-
tual, social, and human context of the cases. As Jennifer Jaff explained,
"I want students to see this process [of legal reasoning] as more than a
game of logic; they must come to see it as a way of articulating the needs
and desires of real people."25 ° Applying this theory to the study of civil
procedure, a course similar to evidence in many respects, Elizabeth
Schneider has observed that questions of procedure necessarily involve
"the human dilemmas of disputes, legal ethics, [and] legal strategy," thus
enabling her to teach civil procedure in a way that "help[s] students de-
velop a greater sensitivity to the normative dimensions of procedure, and
help[s] them understand how procedure affects human lives."'251
Emphasizing context rather than abstract rules is especially appro-
priate and easily accomplished in an evidence course. A number of evi-
dence texts focus on problems rather than cases. The problem method
necessarily involves the students in the facts of specific situations, thus
permitting the instructor to raise questions about strategy and ethics and
the interests of the real-world litigants described in the problems.2 52
Structuring an evidence course around specific problems not only
incorporates feminist concepts of context, but also, in my view, is the
soundest approach to the study of evidence. True understanding of the
rules of evidence comes only with practice. Rather than passively read-
ing court opinions that they may blindly accept as gospel, students who
are analyzing how evidentiary principles should be applied in particular
circumstances are actively involved in the learning process.25 a They be-
come more familiar with the rules and are encouraged to question the
approaches the courts have taken in resolving evidence issues. Although
simulations and role-playing would provide the most active form of
learning, an evidence instructor may have too little time or too many
students to make those options practicable. Asking students to prepare
for class by thinking about the best solution to a number of problems,
and then discussing the various ways to approach the problems in the
classroom, is the next best alternative.
Moreover, because the law of evidence depends heavily on the facts
of each situation, with the application of the rules varying from case to
250. Jaff, Frame-Shifting: An Empowering Methodology for Teaching and Learning Legal Rea-
soning, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 249, 263 (1986).
251. Schneider, supra note 38, at 42. In addition to encouraging students to consider the con-
text of the cases and the real-world impact of the rules of evidence, a feminist teaching method may
help alleviate the alienation felt by women law students, who often find their concerns devalued and
their voices silenced in the traditional law school classroom. See, e.g., Banks, Gender Bias in the
Classroom, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 137 (1988); Weiss & Melling, supra note 193, at 1332-55.
252. See Frug, supra note 33, at 1107-08 (characterizing the problem method as more "femi-
nine" than the case method).
253. See, e.g., Fox, The Good Law School, the Good Curriculum, and the Mind and the Heart,
39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 473, 482 (1989); Johnson & Scales, An Absolutely, Positively True Story: Seven
Reasons Why We Sing, 16 N.M.L. REV. 433, 437-38 (1986); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 40, at 58-
59; Schneider, supra note 38, at 43.
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case, a course that focuses primarily on case law sacrifices some breadth
of experience. Reading twenty pages of appellate court opinions may
indicate how several courts interpreted the rules in two or three cases,
but the same amount of reading in a problem book exposes students to
the issues that arise in applying the rules in a wider variety of contexts.
If practice is the key to learning evidence, applying the rules to a number
of diverse factual settings is more useful than limiting the students' expe-
rience to a few cases.
The fact-based nature of the law of evidence makes it difficult to
predict how the rules will be applied by a given judge in a given case,25 4
and also has implications for the role of the instructor as well as the
method of instruction. Rather than the omniscient purveyor of knowl-
edge who hides the answers from the students, impressing them with her
wisdom, the person standing in the front of an evidence classroom cannot
pretend to know the "right" answer. Students who may accept the inde-
terminacy of the law in their constitutional law classes are understanda-
bly frustrated to learn that in evidence as well there are not always
answers to be learned, but only arguments to be made. It may seem
wrong that evidence principles are not more clear-cut, given that they
involve procedural rules used by lawyers and judges across the country
on a daily basis. Part of the evidence instructor's job is to convince her
students that their initial view of evidence as a group of fixed rules is
inaccurate. When she takes on this role, she is teaching in a manner far
removed from the traditional male law professor following in the foot-
steps of Socrates or Kingsfield. 2"
V. CONCLUSION
Ideally, a feminist approach to evidence would be less abstract, less
complex and hierarchical, less competitive, and less formal than the evi-
dence codes currently in place. None of those goals can fully be imple-
mented within the confines of the current legal system, however, without
adversely affecting the interests of women. A more contextual approach
to evidence issues would substantially increase the discretion given the
judge or jury, thereby leaving room for their gendered attitudes to work
to the detriment of women. Additional rules may be necessary to protect
women from gender bias, even though promulgating more rules will add
to the complexity of evidentiary doctrine. A more cooperative style of
litigation cannot be effected without massive restructuring of the adver-
sary system. And more informal procedures will disadvantage women so
254. See Mengler, supra note 41, at 457 (noting that "the predictability quotient [of the Federal
Rules] is not high"; "[Ilitigants typically come to court uncertain about the admissibility of at least
some of their critical evidence").
255. See Hantzis, Kingsfield and Kennedy: Reappraising the Male Models of Law School Teach-
ing, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 155, 156-57 (1988); Jaff, supra note 250, at 258-61; Menkel-Meadow, supra
note 40, at 79-80.
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long as they do not enjoy the same bargaining power as men and the
adversary system encourages attorneys to engage in abusive practices.
In the short run, therefore, feminist values are in conflict. The ideal
must give way to a more pragmatic approach that devises temporary so-
lutions for an imperfect world. For now, feminists should strive to
change those evidence rules that discriminate against women either on
their face or as applied and to ensure that the law of evidence incorpo-
rates women's perspectives and concerns. Specific evidence rules that
disfavor women can be modified in the short run, and the teaching pro-
cess can be adapted to a feminist model. More fundamental reform of
the law of evidence can come only later, when the legal system no longer
reflects only the perspective of the privileged white male class that cre-
ated it.
